State v. Skipwith
SC19608
| Conn. | Aug 15, 2017Background
- Tabatha Cornell (victim) notified prosecutors she invoked constitutional victim rights after her daughter was killed by Justin Skipwith.
- Cornell was not allowed to object to the plea bargain or to make a statement at Skipwith’s sentencing.
- She moved in Superior Court to vacate Skipwith’s sentence; the trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding the sentence was not illegal.
- Cornell filed a writ of error; the Appellate Court dismissed it, concluding Practice Book § 43-22 did not authorize vacatur for the denial of victim presence/statement rights.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted certification, concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the writ of error, but affirmed the Appellate Court on the alternative ground that vacating the sentence was a form of appellate relief barred by the victim’s rights amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether victim may obtain vacatur of a criminal sentence for denial of constitutional victim rights | Cornell: sentence was "imposed in an illegal manner" and must be vacated so she can be heard | State: such relief is barred by lack of statutory authorization and by the constitutional bar on appellate relief | Held: Victim may seek writ of error, but vacatur of sentence is barred by the amendment’s prohibition on appellate relief that would affect the judgment or abridge defendant’s rights |
| Whether appellate courts have jurisdiction over writs of error to enforce victim’s constitutional rights | Cornell: common-law writ of error provides jurisdiction regardless of absence of statutory appeal right | State: Gault means no judicial remedy absent legislative authorization | Held: Writ of error is a common-law remedy; courts retain jurisdiction unless statute or constitution removes it; Gault did not eliminate writ jurisdiction |
| Scope of the amendment’s clause that "Nothing... shall be construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or ground for appellate relief" | Cornell: provision shouldn’t bar all appellate forms of relief for victims | State: clause bars judicial relief for victims unless legislature provides it | Held: Clause bars relief that would directly affect criminal judgment or abridge defendant’s rights, but does not strip courts of authority to interpret or implement the amendment in all contexts |
| Standing and availability of writ of error by nonparty victim | Cornell: she is an aggrieved nonparty entitled to file writ under common law / Practice Book | State: victims lack party status and appellate remedies (per Gault) | Held: Cornell had standing under common-law requirements (codified in Practice Book §72-1) to bring a writ of error, but the specific remedy she sought was constitutionally barred |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330 (2012) (addressed victims’ ability to appeal and limits of statutory appeal rights)
- State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492 (2002) (describing writ of error as a common-law remedy independent of statute)
- State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618 (1912) (historic statement that writ of error is the common-law method for bringing causes to higher court)
- State v. Assuntino, 173 Conn. 104 (1977) (recognizing longstanding availability of writ of error and that statutes had been merely declaratory)
- State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147 (1999) (writ of error as proper vehicle for appellate review when appeal is unavailable)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishes judiciary’s duty to interpret and apply constitutional provisions)