State v. Sharp
305 Kan. 1076
| Kan. | 2017Background
- On Jan. 25, 2013 Officer Donald Bowers observed Travis Sharp at a crowded intersection apparently "power braking": engine revving, heavy smoke from under the SUV, smell of burning rubber, and a spinning right rear tire while the vehicle was stationary.
- Bowers activated rear lights to change lanes, observed Sharp accelerate normally when the light turned green, then activated front lights and stopped Sharp after clearing the intersection.
- Sharp admitted to "burning my tires," performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and registered BAC above the legal limit; he was charged with exhibition of speed (K.S.A. 8-1565) and DUI (K.S.A. 8-1567).
- Sharp moved to suppress evidence arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion; he also challenged K.S.A. 8-1565 as unconstitutionally vague.
- The district court denied suppression; a bench trial on stipulated facts convicted Sharp of DUI and exhibition of speed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute vague and that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion.
- The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals only on the lack of reasonable suspicion ground, vacated the vagueness holding as unnecessary, reversed Sharp's convictions, and directed the district court to grant suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Sharp | Bowers observed conduct (spinning tires, smoke, smell) consistent with preparing to drag race, giving particularized suspicion of criminal activity | Sharp: conduct occurred while stationary; no movement/acceleration to violate K.S.A. 8-1565 and lawful acceleration when light changed dispelled suspicion | Held: No reasonable suspicion — totality of circumstances (including lawful acceleration) negated a reasonable belief of past, present, or imminent crime; stop unlawful |
| Whether K.S.A. 8-1565 ("exhibition of speed or acceleration") is unconstitutionally vague as applied | State: statute prohibits showing vehicle's power/endurance (e.g., warming tires) | Sharp: language is vague and requires guessing the prohibited conduct | Held: Vagueness issue not decided — court vacated Court of Appeals' vagueness ruling because lack of reasonable suspicion provided alternative relief |
| Applicability of the good-faith exception to evidence suppression | State: officer reasonably relied on statute/ordinance; good-faith would admit evidence | Sharp: reliance not presented below; statute vague | Held: Not addressed — good-faith exception not considered because not raised in district court |
| Whether municipal ordinance or other statutory provisions justify the stop (Devenpeck claim) | State: alternative bases (e.g., Olathe ordinance) could support stop | Sharp: issue not litigated below | Held: Not considered — appellate court refused to entertain arguments not raised at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pettay, 299 Kan. 763 (review standard for suppression factual findings and legal conclusions)
- City of Atwood v. Pianalto, 301 Kan. 1008 (traffic stop is a seizure; reasonable suspicion required)
- State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482 (totality-of-circumstances standard; deference to trained officers)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (totality-of-circumstances; no divide-and-conquer analysis)
- State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881 (reasonable-suspicion analysis from officer's viewpoint)
- State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84 (criminal statutes strictly construed in favor of the accused)
- City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221 (prior holding on vagueness of similar "exhibition of speed" ordinance)
- State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727 (courts should evaluate totality of circumstances, not pigeonhole factors)