205 A.3d 966
Md.2019Background
- Three-year-old Luke Hill was left in the care of Amanda and Kevin Sewell on May 2–3, 2015; he was later found severely injured and died on May 5, 2015.
- Amanda and Kevin exchanged multiple text messages while Luke was in their care; the texts discussed bruises, vomiting, biting, and attempts to conceal injuries.
- Amanda observed extensive injuries and transported Luke to his mother, who called 911; medical testimony established numerous inflicted injuries and abusive head trauma.
- Kevin Sewell was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree child abuse, and neglect; Amanda received immunity and testified for the State.
- At trial the State admitted screenshots and readings of the texts over Kevin’s marital-communications privilege objection; Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding the State failed to rebut the presumption of confidentiality.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether marital-communications privilege should be narrowly construed and whether the texts were admissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sewell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether privileges (including marital communications) should be narrowly construed | Privileges exclude relevant evidence; courts should construe them narrowly and resolve ambiguities against the privilege | Past Maryland precedent presumes marital communications confidential; no broad change is required | Court reaffirmed that testimonial privileges should be narrowly construed but preserved the rebuttable presumption that marital communications are confidential |
| Whether text messages between spouses are presumptively confidential | Texts can lack confidentiality depending on medium/circumstances; State urged that practical risk of third-party access can rebut confidentiality | Texts can be confidential; medium alone does not defeat the privilege and waiver must be clear | Court held text messages are presumptively confidential like other marital communications; confidentiality is determined case-by-case (no categorical rule against texts) |
| Whether these specific texts were protected given Maryland’s mandatory child-abuse reporting statute (FL §5-705) | When a spouse communicates information that the other spouse is under a statutory duty to report, objective reasonable expectation of confidentiality is destroyed; FL §5-705 applies "notwithstanding any other provision of law" | Sewell argued marital privilege applies—even to communications in furtherance of a crime—and legislative exceptions would appear in CJP if intended | Court held FL §5-705 defeats the reasonable-expectation-of-confidentiality for communications about reportable child abuse; the Sewell texts were admissible because Amanda had a legal duty to report and Kevin could not reasonably expect confidentiality |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryant v. State, 393 Md. 196 (2006) (privilege statutes interpreted narrowly)
- E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma–Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396 (1998) (attorney-client privilege narrowly construed)
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552 (1998) (accountant-client privilege narrowly construed)
- Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538 (1977) (marital communications protect confidences; communications intended to be secret are privileged)
- Enriquez v. State, 327 Md. 365 (1992) (rebuttable presumption that marital communications are confidential)
- Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514 (1964) (expectation of confidentiality destroyed when communication transmitted through a third party)
- Mazzone v. State, 336 Md. 379 (1994) (treatment of privileged communications in electronic surveillance context)
- Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180 (2000) (exceptions where spouse is victim of spouse’s crime)