State v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182

Background

In 1990 Jai'Mar Scott (age 17 at offense) was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to an exceptional term of 900 months (de facto life).
Scott later sought collateral relief after Miller v. Alabama, arguing his de facto life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because youth was not considered at sentencing.
Washington enacted a "Miller fix" statute, RCW 9.94A.730, allowing juvenile-offender inmates to petition the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) for early release after 20 years (with a presumption of release).
The trial court granted Scott a new sentencing hearing; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding RCW 9.94A.730 provides an adequate Miller remedy. The State Supreme Court granted review.
The ISRB considered Scott's youth at a parole hearing and denied release based on risk evaluations and recommended treatment.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: because RCW 9.94A.730 provides an adequate remedy under federal Miller/Montgomery precedent, resentencing via collateral relief (PRP) was unavailable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Scott)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Miller’s retroactive protection makes Scott’s collateral challenge timely	Miller is a retroactive, material change; Scott’s de facto life sentence requires resentencing	Miller is retroactive but RCW 9.94A.730 supplies an adequate postconviction remedy, so collateral relief is unavailable	Miller is retroactive, but collateral resentencing relief is unavailable because an adequate remedy (RCW 9.94A.730 parole process) exists
Whether parole eligibility under RCW 9.94A.730 cures a Miller violation	Parole eligibility is insufficient; only resentencing with youth considered satisfies Miller/Houston‑Sconiers and state law	Parole eligibility satisfies Miller/Montgomery; it gives meaningful opportunity for release and preserves finality	Under federal Eighth Amendment precedent (Miller/Montgomery) parole eligibility is an adequate remedy; RCW 9.94A.730 cures the Miller violation
Adequacy of ISRB review to account for "youth and attendant characteristics" required by Miller	ISRB parole process does not guarantee the individualized sentencing consideration Miller requires; resentencing in court is necessary	ISRB may and did consider Scott’s youth; statute even gives a presumption of release and earlier eligibility than Wyoming’s statute cited in Montgomery	Court finds ISRB/parole process can satisfy Miller’s requirement under federal precedent; Scott’s ISRB hearing did address youth factors
Whether Washington Constitution / state precedent (Fain, McNeil) require more than RCW 9.94A.730	State constitutional protections (and Fain/McNeil) demand resentencing and reject parole as an equivalent remedy	Federal precedent governs Eighth Amendment remedy; RCW 9.94A.730 meets those federal requirements	The adequacy question under Washington law remains open per concurrences: majority does not decide state‑constitutional issue and confines holding to federal Eighth Amendment adequacy

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Miller requires consideration of youth before life-without-parole)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller is retroactive; states may remedy Miller by parole eligibility)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (capital punishment barred for juveniles)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 (Washington application of Miller to de facto life sentences)
State v. Houston‑Sconiers, 188 Wash.2d 1 (trial courts must consider youth at sentencing; discretion required)
State v. Fain, 94 Wash.2d 387 (under Washington law, mere possibility of parole is not equivalent to resentencing)
In re Personal Restraint of McNeil, 181 Wash.2d 582 (legislative "fixes" must provide both substantive and procedural protections)