State v. Scoggins
70 So. 3d 145
La. Ct. App.2011Background
- State charged Scoggin by bill of information with molestation of his eight-year-old niece (I.B.) for acts in August 2008; charge encompassed acts from January to October 2008.
- State sought to introduce other acts under La. C.E. art. 412.2 involving an unadjudicated prior molestation of another juvenile (C.Y.) years earlier.
- Court previously limited and then allowed Reverend Henry Hudson to testify regarding a meeting with the defendant; Supreme Court later limited testimony per clergyman's privilege waiver.
- State sought to amend the information to cover pre- and post-August 15, 2008 periods; defense argued this could subject Scoggin to life imprisonment and require grand jury indictment.
- Jury found Scoggin guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile; sentence imposed was 15 years with ten years to be served in custody and probation thereafter; several post-trial motions followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether information charging pre- and post-August 15, 2008 acts required grand jury indictment. | State contends single information valid as corpus delicti charged. | Scoggins contends life-imprisonment risk and old statute require indictment. | Meritless; information valid where life imprisonment not at stake and corpus delicti charged. |
| Whether admission of other crimes evidence on C.Y. was proper under Art. 412.2 and 403. | State offered unadjudicated prior acts to show lustful disposition; probative value outweighs prejudice. | Evidence prejudicial and needlessly cumulative; insufficient notice. | Admissible; probative value outweighed prejudice; harmless error if any. |
| Whether Reverend Hudson’s clergyman’s privilege was properly applied and testimony limited. | Privilege not applicable; testimony about meeting permissible. | Privilege waivable; limit on testimony upheld. | Law of the case and prior rulings bar reconsideration; testimony properly limited. |
| Whether the sentence of 15 years for indecent behavior with a juvenile is excessive. | State argues within statutory range and reflects protection of children. | Sentence is excessive and disproportionate. | Not excessive; within range, supported by factual basis and mitigating considerations. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Dick, 951 So. 2d 124 (La. 1/26/07) (addressed duration of life-imprisonment risk and grand jury indictment rule based on life sentencing)
- State v. Sugasti, 820 So. 2d 518 (La. 6/21/02) (principles for applying prior acts evidence and life-imprisonment considerations)
- State v. Williams, 830 So. 2d 984 (La. 10/15/02) (Art. 412.2 admissibility no pretrial evidentiary hearing required; abuse of discretion standard)
- State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326 (La. 5/22/95) (pretrial admissibility and balancing standard for prior acts)
- State v. Rose, 949 So. 2d 1236 (La. 2/22/07) (burden of proof for Art. 1104/404 questions; Huddleston reference)
- State v. Cotton, 965 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/19/2007) (art. 412.2 prior acts admissibility; notice sufficiency)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (U.S. 1988) (preponderance standard for 404(b) evidence)
- United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998) (Enjady balancing test for prior acts evidence)