STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel SUGASTI
No. 2001-K-3407
Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 21, 2002
820 So. 2d 518
WEIMER, Justice.
Gwendolyn K. Brown, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Gretna, Alison Wallis, Harvey, Counsel for Respondent.
WEIMER, Justice.
Certiorari was granted in this matter to determine whether legislative changes reducing sentencing provisions for certain offenses should be applied to offenses committed prior to the effective date of the statute when the dеfendant is sentenced following the effective date of the changes.1 At issue in this case is the
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeal which vacated the sentence and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 14, 1999, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney‘s office filed a bill of information charging Daniel Sugasti with possession of heroin on September 5, 1998, in violation of
Over 24 months later, the defendant appeared before the court on June 21, 2001, at which time he entered a negotiated plea of guilty as charged to three offenses—possession of heroin, possession of alprazolam and possession of marijuana. The trial judge conducted a Boykin2 examination and accepted the defendant‘s plea of guilty. Defendant waived the delay for sentencing following which the judge sentenced him to five years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections for possession of heroin, five years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections for possession of alprazolam, six months pаrish prison for possession of marijuana, a fine, court costs and commission fees. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The trial judge further ordered the sentences suspended and placed defendant on active probation for a period of five years.
The State objected to the imposition of suspended sentences on the basis that 2001 La. Acts No. 403, allowing for a suspended sentence for a violation of
On appeal, the fifth circuit, relying on State v. Wright, 384 So.2d 399, 401 (La. 1980), agreed with the argument presented by the State that the sentence in effect at the time the crime is committed is the proper sentence to be imposed. The court of appeal vacated the penalty imposed by the trial court and remanded the matter for resentencing, reserving defendant‘s right to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Sugasti, 01-0770 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/27/01), 802 So.2d 943, writ granted, 01-3407, (La.2/22/02), 810 So.2d 1133.
The court of appeal reasoned as follows: “Although the trial judge was permitted to consider the ameliorative changes in the law, he erred when he suspended the defendant‘s sentence in derogation of the sentencing provisions applicable at the time of the offense.” Sugasti, 01-0770 at 6, 802 So.2d at 946. The court of appeal relied on 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 6 which provides that “this Act shall only have prospective effect.”
Thе effective date of Act 403 was June 15, 2001, just days before the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced for offenses committed September 5, 1998, almost three years earlier. Prior to the amendment, the penalty for possession of heroin was not less than four nor more than ten years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Following the effective date of the amendment, the penalty for possession of heroin shall be imprisonment at hard labor for not less than four years nor more than ten years and may, in addition, be required
The defendant applied for writ of certiorari which this court granted. Defendant argues thаt the court of appeal‘s action will frustrate the legislature‘s sweeping revisions of the law to ameliorate the draconian penalties it had formerly provided for serious drug offenses. Defendant argues Section 6 of 2001 La. Acts No. 403 precludes only retroactive application of the changes to cases in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced before June 15, 2001, the effective date of the act. He argues that anyone sentenced following the effective date of the act should receive the benefit of the reduced penalty provision.
DISCUSSION
In an attempt to reduce incarceration rates for non-violent offenders and ease the finanсial burden on the State, the legislature enacted changes in certain penalty provisions during the 2001 Regular Session. At issue in this case is the revision to
Prior to the 2001 amendments a defendant sentenced for possession of heroin was not eligible for probation or suspension of sentence.
This court has consistently held that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which the convicted accused must suffer. State v. Wright, 384 So.2d 399, 401 (La.1980). A defendant must be sentenced according to sentencing provisions in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118, 130-131 (La.1983). “The mere fact that a statute may be subsequently amended, after the commission of the crime, so as to modify or lessen the possible penalty to be imposed, does not extinguish liability for the offense committed under the former statutе.” Id.
In State v. Clark, 391 So.2d 1174 (La. 1980), this court concluded that an ameliorative
While we are aware of the general tenor of the legislation enacted during the 2001 Regular Session with regard to sentencing provisions, we are also cognizant of the fact that sentencing is the province of the legislature. Had it been the intention of the legislature to have the statute apply to all sentences imposed following the effective date of the statute, it could have written the statute to so state.
Additionally, in this case the legislature specifically provided that the provisions of Act 403 “shаll only have prospective effect.” 2001 La. Acts No. 403, § 6. Had the legislature intended for the more lenient sentencing provisions to take effect immediately, language signifying that intent could have easily been incorporated into the act.
We distinguish Act 403 from the provisions of 2001 La. Acts No. 1163, which amended the sentencing provisions of
We note that the penalty provision for violation of
There is a strong presumption against retroactivity of statutes. Louisiana law dictates that “[n]o Section оf the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.”
In this particular case, Mr. Sugasti violated
Policy rеasons mitigate against holding that the amendment to
Everyone is presumed to know the law, including the penalty provisions that apply. As such, those who engage in criminal activity must face the consеquences of their actions, including the penalty provisions that apply as of the date of the offense.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeal and remand the matter to the district court for sentencing consistent with this opinion. Defendant‘s right to withdraw his guilty plea is reserved.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT.
JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion in this case. It is illogical to conclude that the legislature intended that drunk drivers convicted under
The majority, in the instant case, holds that the amendment to
However, this Court held in State v. Michael Mayeux, 01-KK-3195 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 526, decided on the same day as the instant case, that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under the penalty provisions of
I believe that the same rationale as expressed by this Court in Mayeux should apply in the instant case. As pointed out in the majority‘s decision, the legislature has enacted changes in certain рenalty provisions in an attempt to reduce incarceration rates for non-violent offenders and ease the financial burden on the State. Like the amendment to
Regarding the amendment to
[t]he bill is fiscally responsible and beneficial to the people of Louisiana as the state spends a great deal of money on incarceration. When someone has a problem, they need treatment; by providing the treatment, the state can reduce its repetitive costs for incarceration as a result of DWI offenses and gives these offenders an opportunity to not return to that style of behavior. This benefits the state and the individual.
Senator C.D. Jones presented Senate Bill No. 239, proposed amendment to
In sentencing Sugasti under the post-amendment sentencing provisions of
“[s]ection 6 of the new act says that the effects shall be prospective only. And the court believes thаt since the Court is giving this sentence after the effective date of the act, that is prospective to the effective date of the act ... The Court does believe that the sentence is not part of the substantive facts of the crime and therefore the law requires that the Court consider the sentence that the Legislature has enactеd as of the date of the sentencing.”
I agree with the trial court‘s reasoning. Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeal‘s decision vacating Sugasti‘s sentence and reinstate the trial court‘s sentence under the amended penalty provisions of
Notes
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substanсe classified in Schedule I unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a practitioner or as provided in R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part. Any person who violates this Subsection with respect to:
(1) A substance classified in Schedule I which is a narcotic drug (all substances in Schedule I preceded by an asterisk), shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than four years nor more than ten years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and may, in addition, be required to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.