State v. Scerba, 2014 Ohio 3002

Defendant Gene Scerba was indicted for robbery (R.C. 2911.02(A)(2)) after an incident in a Rite-Aid where he concealed merchandise and a store employee fell as he fled. He initially pled guilty to robbery but later withdrew that plea.
After a brief motion hearing in which defense counsel sought to withdraw for breakdown in communication, the court denied counsel’s motion.
On second plea hearing, Scerba pled guilty to attempted robbery (felony 4), with an agreed 18‑month sentence (maximum) and credit for time served; the court accepted the plea and sentenced him accordingly.
Scerba appealed, asserting (1) his second plea was not knowing and voluntary and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest between him and his attorney.
The trial court’s plea colloquy included warnings about constitutional rights and questions confirming voluntariness; Scerba answered affirmatively that he understood and was pleading voluntarily.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the second guilty plea was knowing and voluntary under Crim.R. 11	Court and State: colloquy complied with Crim.R. 11; constitutional waivers were strictly complied with; nonconstitutional advisements substantially complied with	Scerba: prior withdrawn plea was a “red flag”; court should have inquired into actual guilt and his understanding before accepting second plea	Affirmed — plea was knowing and voluntary; Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) strictly complied with and (a)/(b) substantially complied; prior withdrawal did not undermine voluntariness
Whether counsel’s disagreement with defendant about pleading created a conflict of interest rendering counsel ineffective	State: no evidence counsel’s conduct fell below objective standard or that counsel coerced plea; difference of opinion is not a disqualifying conflict	Scerba: counsel favored plea while he opposed it; counsel’s motion to withdraw shows conflict and impaired voluntariness	Affirmed — no ineffective assistance; disagreement over strategy is not a conflict of interest under Cuyler/Wood; Strickland standard not met

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under due process)
State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 (Ohio 2008) (trial courts urged to literally comply with Crim.R. 11; strict compliance for constitutional rights)
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106 (Ohio 1990) (substantial compliance standard for nonconstitutional Crim.R. 11 advisements)
State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 (Ohio 2008) (defendant challenging nonconstitutional Crim.R.11 errors must show prejudice; plea would not have been entered)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (Ohio 1989) (adopts Strickland standard in Ohio)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (conflict of interest when counsel represents multiple defendants with adverse interests)
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1981) (possible due process violation where counsel’s loyalties conflicted due to payment/source of representation)
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1975) (counseled guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt)