State v. Santiago, 145 Conn. App. 374

Santiago was convicted of assault in the first degree under § 53a-59(a)(3) and risk of injury to a child under § 53-21(1) after shaken baby syndrome facts.
He received consecutive sentences: ten years for assault plus ten years special parole, and ten years for risk of injury to a child, total 20 years incarcerated with 10 years special parole.
In 2012, Santiago moved to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22, alleging double jeopardy violated the state and federal constitutions.
The trial court denied the motion, then sua sponte dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, prompting this appeal.
The appellate court first addressed jurisdiction, then reached the merits, including whether the two offenses produce a double jeopardy violation and whether consecutive sentencing was proper.
The court ultimately held that subject matter jurisdiction existed, that there was no double jeopardy violation, and that consecutive sentencing was permissible; the support for the judgment was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction	Santiago: court lacked jurisdiction to hear a motion to correct an illegal sentence.	State: because double jeopardy grounds were raised, the court had jurisdiction to address the merits.	Court had jurisdiction; dismissal was error.
Does double jeopardy bar consecutive sentences for § 53a-59(a)(3) and § 53-21(1)	Santiago: consecutive sentences violate double jeopardy.	State: the offenses are distinct with different elements; no double jeopardy violation.	No double jeopardy violation; offenses are separate and validly punished in sequence.
Are § 53a-59(a)(3) and § 53-21(1) properly treated as separate offenses for purposes of multiple punishment	Santiago argues they are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.	State argues they are distinct offenses with different elements and mental states.	They are distinct offenses; separate punishments are permitted.
Is consecutive sentencing authorized under § 53a-37 and related statutes	Santiago contends consecutive sentences may violate statutory limits.	State asserts § 53a-37 allows consecutive sentencing for separate offenses.	Consecutive sentencing was permissible and properly imposed.
Form of judgment and remand direction	N/A	N/A	Form of judgment is improper; judgment of dismissal reversed and remanded to reinstate denial.

State v. Delgado, 116 Conn. App. 434 (2009) (procedure for recognizing double jeopardy as a ground to challenge a sentence)
State v. Wright, 107 Conn. App. 152 (2008) (when challenge concerns legality of sentence, focus on sentencing procedure)
State v. Gilchrist, 24 Conn. App. 624 (1991) (consecutive sentencing for separate offenses; same transaction context)
State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (2002) (assault in the first degree and related offenses; double jeopardy analysis)
Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338 (2013) (statutory interpretation and use of text over extrinsic evidence)
State v. DeMatteo, 13 Conn. App. 596 (1988) (test for whether two offenses are separate for double jeopardy)
State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527 (2006) (plenary review of statutory interpretation in double jeopardy context)
Meyer v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (noted for discussion on mandatory minimum enhancements treated as elements)