State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1

Background

Justice Espinosa files a separate dissent to the court’s decision that Connecticut’s death penalty is unconstitutional as applied after P.A. 12-5, arguing the majority usurped legislative power.
P.A. 12-5 (2012) prospectively repealed the death penalty but preserved it for offenders who committed crimes before the repeal; legislature recently expressed retention for those on death row.
Espinosa emphasizes deference to legislative judgment and contends the majority ignored evidence (e.g., a 2014 jury verdict imposing death post‑P.A. 12-5) and relied on selective extra‑record materials.
He criticizes the majority and concurrence for engaging in extra-record fact‑finding, attributing to them judicial activism and view‑based policymaking contrary to separation of powers.
The dissent objects to the concurrence’s treatment of racial‑bias arguments as outside the record and pending separate habeas proceedings, cautioning against addressing issues not properly before the court.
Espinosa recounts several brutal homicides of people on death row to underscore the gravity of the crimes and the legislature/juries’ decisions to impose or preserve capital punishment for those offenders.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether P.A. 12-5’s prospective repeal shows a legislative consensus that death penalty "comports with contemporary standards of decency" is violated	Majority: contemporary standards evolved; death penalty unconstitutional as applied	Espinosa: legislature deliberately retained death penalty for pre‑repeal offenders; no clear consensus against capital punishment	Espinosa: court should defer to legislature absent compelling proof of unconstitutionality; majority overstepped
Whether court may rely on extra‑record materials and selective statistics in evaluating contemporary standards	Majority: may consider legislative history and social science showing declining support and racial/geographic patterns	Espinosa: such extra‑record fact‑finding is improper and selective; ignores contrary evidence (e.g., post‑repeal jury sentence)	Espinosa: fact‑finding beyond the record and selective citation unacceptable; must respect legislative record and jury practice
Whether addressing racial‑bias/systemic disparity in this appeal is appropriate	Concurrence: implicit/unconscious bias in capital system supports constitutional concern	Espinosa: racial‑disparity claims are pending in separate habeas consolidated litigation and lack record here	Espinosa: concurrence improperly addresses unresolved habeas record; racial‑bias issue not ripe in this appeal
Whether judicially abolishing the death penalty violates separation of powers and democratic accountability	Majority: constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment permits judicial invalidation	Espinosa: judicial abolition substitutes the will of four justices for that of the people and legislature; violates separation of powers	Espinosa: court should exercise restraint and uphold statute unless invalidity is clear beyond reasonable doubt

Key Cases Cited

Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225 (Conn. 2015) (criticized majority’s supervisory authority expansion)
Blumberg Assocs. Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Conn., 311 Conn. 123 (Conn. 2014) (discussed by dissent as example of judicial overreach)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (legislative enactments as objective evidence of contemporary values)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (U.S. 1803) (judiciary’s role to "say what the law is")
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008) (strong presumption of validity for statutes)
State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71 (Conn. 2011) (contemporary standards inquiry; legislative refinements do not necessarily signal total disapproval of death penalty)
State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677 (Conn. 1976) (legislature’s role in defining crimes and punishments)
State v. Matos, 240 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1997) (presumption of statute validity; uphold unless invalidity is clear)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1987) (standard for proving purposeful discrimination in capital cases)