261 A.3d 646
Vt.2021Background:
- In Sept. 2017 a law-enforcement task force posed online as a fictitious 14‑year‑old (“Grayson”); defendant responded to an ad and engaged in explicit electronic messages requesting oral sex and stating he didn’t care about age.
- When Grayson said he was 14, defendant repeatedly affirmed that was acceptable, demanded an address, then drove to a prearranged meeting location and was arrested.
- Defendant was charged under 13 V.S.A. § 2828 (criminalizing knowingly soliciting, luring, or enticing a child under 16 or a person believed to be under 16 to engage in sexual acts or lewd conduct).
- Defendant moved to dismiss on First Amendment and vagueness/overbreadth grounds and argued the statute lacks a specific‑intent requirement; the superior court denied the motion; a jury convicted him.
- Sentence: 2–5 years (two years to serve) and 10 years’ probation; one probation condition required residing at an approved residence as directed by the probation officer—defendant appealed that condition.
Issues:
| Issue | State's Argument | Masic's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2828 is a content‑based restriction on speech requiring strict scrutiny | Statute targets offers to commit illegal sexual acts with minors, i.e., speech integral to criminal conduct, so it is categorically excluded from First Amendment protection | Statute regulates speech based on content/subject matter and thus must survive strict scrutiny | Court: Not a protected content‑based restriction; speech integral to criminal conduct (offers to commit child sexual offenses) falls outside First Amendment strict scrutiny (affirmed conviction) |
| Whether § 2828 is facially overbroad or unconstitutionally vague | § 2828 contains a knowingly scienter and clear terms (solicit/lure/entice; defined target and sexual‑act terms), so it is neither substantially overbroad nor vague | Statute is overbroad (chills protected sexual expression, roleplay, artistic speech) and vague (no specific‑intent requirement) | Court: Rejected facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges; scienter and statutory language sufficiently narrow the statute |
| Whether statute is unconstitutional as‑applied and whether "knowingly" is insufficient mens rea | State: "Knowingly" and attempt language supply the requisite culpability; application here is within statute’s scope | Masic: He lacked specific intent (argued he intended to warn, not solicit); statute should require purposeful intent | Court: As‑applied challenge fails—evidence supports that defendant acted knowingly; Constitution does not require a higher mens rea than "knowingly" |
| Whether the probation condition permitting residence as directed by probation officer was proper | State: Restrictions on residence may be warranted given the offense; remand for findings is appropriate | Masic: Condition improperly delegated and lacked factual findings/standards | Court: Condition invalid as imposed without findings or standards; remanded for the superior court to justify, revise, or strike the condition |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (categorical exclusion of speech integral to criminal conduct)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (state interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children is of surpassing importance)
- Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (general prohibition on content‑based restrictions)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (content‑based regulations presumptively invalid)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (limits on overbreadth doctrine; well‑defined exceptions to First Amendment)
- Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (speech used as an integral part of unlawful conduct may be regulated)
- United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. upholding federal child‑luring statute; speech arranging sexual conduct with minors not protected)
- United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. similar principle: no First Amendment right to induce a minor to commit sexual crimes)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth is a disfavored, "strong medicine" remedy)
- State v. Moses, 159 Vt. 294 (Vt. 1992) (court may not delegate undefined probation conditions to probation officer)
