813 S.E.2d 487
S.C.2018Background
- Petitioner Lamont Samuel, indicted for murder, sought to waive counsel and proceed pro se at the start of trial and submitted to a Faretta colloquy.
- Samuel, age 21, was educated and articulated awareness of the charge, potential penalties, Fifth Amendment rights, and some legal concepts from a Criminal Law Handbook.
- Samuel told the court attorney Carl Grant had provided coaching; the judge summoned Grant to verify the nature/extent of any assistance.
- Grant testified he had not been retained, had not coached Samuel as described, and would not assist at trial. The judge concluded Samuel was not candid and was manipulating proceedings and denied the Faretta motion.
- Samuel was tried with counsel, convicted, and sentenced; the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and reversed, ordering a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Samuel) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the judge may rely on third-party testimony (Grant) to deny a pretrial Faretta request | Samuel: Third-party evidence of possible coaching is irrelevant to the narrow Faretta inquiry (whether waiver is knowing, intelligent, voluntary) | State: The judge properly investigated Samuel's claimed reliance on Grant and could deny pro se status if manipulative | Court: Reversed — third-party testimony about prospective assistance was improperly used to deny a pretrial Faretta request because it bore on competence to represent, not on the voluntariness of the waiver |
| Whether Samuel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel | Samuel: He knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver after colloquy and repeated requests | State: The judge reasonably found Samuel not candid and manipulative, undermining voluntariness | Court: Held waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; judge erred in denying Faretta on these facts |
| Whether Rule 3.3 (candor to tribunal) and ethics considerations justify denying Faretta | State: Cited Rule 3.3 and precedent permitting denial when defendant manipulates proceedings | Samuel: Ethical rules governing attorneys are not a proper basis to deny a defendant's constitutional right to self-represent | Court: Held reliance on Rule 3.3 and similar ethics-based grounds to deny a pretrial Faretta request was misplaced here; defendants are not bound by attorney ethical rules for invoking Faretta |
| Whether manipulative or dilatory motives can support denial of Faretta pretrial | State: The judge may consider manipulative intent (Gardner and other authority) and deny pro se status to protect court integrity | Samuel: Prior cases require the Faretta colloquy be the exclusive inquiry pretrial; manipulation findings were unsupported here | Court: While manipulation can later justify revocation during trial, at the pretrial Faretta stage the court may only assess voluntariness; here manipulation finding rested on irrelevant evidence and could not justify denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and sets Faretta colloquy standard)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competence required is competence to waive counsel, not competence to conduct defense)
- State v. Brewer, 328 S.C. 117 (trial judge's inquiry focuses on defendant's understanding; lack of legal expertise alone does not justify denial)
- State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27 (pretrial Faretta request inquiry is limited to voluntariness; improper motives alone generally do not bar the right)
- United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553 (4th Cir.) (distinguishes sincere Faretta requests from manipulative attempts to exploit self-representation)
- United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281 (4th Cir.) (self-represented defendants assume responsibility to act appropriately; disruptive conduct may justify revocation)