State v. Sampson, 301 P.3d 276

Background

Sampson was convicted of first-degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery; he challenged the trial court’s sequestration ruling and evidentiary rulings.
The trial court allowed Detective Fatkin to sit at the prosecution table and remain in the courtroom despite a sequestration order.
Fatkin testified multiple times, tying his testimony to other witnesses, which raised concerns about credibility and the spirit of sequestration.
Sampson confronted the exclusion of his cross-examination on Joey Smith’s prior felony conviction, arguing it violated his theory of defense.
The State argued the officer’s presence was permissible for trial efficiency; the court ultimately found abuse of discretion in Fatkin’s table presence and courtroom presence, but harmless overall to the verdict.
The court held the trial court properly excluded Smith’s prior felony conviction under K.S.A. 60-421 and 60-422, and did not reach arguments under K.S.A. 60-446 or 60-447 due to preservation issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fatkin sitting at the prosecution table was an abuse of discretion	Sampson contends it violated sequestration and biased the jury.	The State asserts practicality and need for the detective’s assistance; discretion exists.	Abuse; detective at table not permissible; no discretion to allow.
Whether Fatkin’s presence in the courtroom after sequestration was an abuse of discretion	Fatkin’s presence tainted testimony and violated sequestration.	Presence aided prosecution; should be permissible under discretion.	Abuse; Fatkin’s courtroom presence violated sequestration under the circumstances.
Whether the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Officer’s presence could have affected credibility and verdict.	No prejudice shown; verdict unaffected.	Harmless; evidence showed Sampson aided and abetted; verdict affirmed.
Whether the trial court properly excluded Smith’s prior felony conviction under 60-421/60-422	Smith opened the door; prior conviction admissible to impeach credibility.	Excluded under 60-421/60-422; preservation issues for 60-446/60-447.	Properly excluded under 60-421 and 60-422; no preservation for 60-446/60-447.
Whether Sampson’s theory of defense was unconstitutionally restricted by evidentiary rulings	Evidence of prior conviction would support his defense theory.	Rules of evidence govern admissibility; defense not improperly curtailed.	Evidentiary rulings upheld; right to present a defense balanced with rules.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557 (1998) (sequestration discretion in witness exclusion)
State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329 (2008) (better practice discouraging law enforcement at prosecutor's table)
State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76 (2009) (prejudice for constitutional error burden rests with State)
Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (2011) (harmless error standard beyond reasonable doubt)
State v. Theus, 207 Kan. 571 (1971) (sequestration discretion in witness presence)
State v. Laughlin, 216 Kan. 54 (1975) (impeachment limitations for prior convictions)
State v. Harris, 215 Kan. 961 (1974) (impeachment of credibility limitations for non-defendant witness)
State v. Edwards, 209 Kan. 696 (1972) (detective participation in trial and related considerations)
State v. Smallwood, 223 Kan. 320 (1978) (limits on specific instances of conduct to prove character)
Laughlin (quoted), 216 Kan. 54 (1975) (exceptional admission rules for impeachment evidence)