State v. S. Keefe, 478 P.3d 830

In 1985, Steven Wayne Keefe (age 17) burglarized a Great Falls home and murdered three members of the McKay family; he was convicted in 1986 and originally sentenced to three consecutive life terms without parole plus enhancements.
In 2017 Keefe sought postconviction relief arguing his mandatory LWOP sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana; Montana stayed proceedings pending state and federal law developments and then applied Steilman v. Michael.
The District Court ordered a resentencing, appointed a neutral court expert (Dr. Robert Page), denied Keefe state funds to hire defense experts, and refused a jury finding on "irreparable corruption."
At the April 2019 resentencing the court again imposed three consecutive life-without-parole terms; the court stated it would not consider Keefe’s positive post-offense rehabilitation evidence.
Montana Supreme Court reviewed whether (1) denial of a defense expert violated due process; (2) the record supported a finding Keefe was "irreparably corrupt" and permanently incorrigible; and (3) that factual determination must be made by a jury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Keefe)	Held
1) Did denying funds for Keefe’s own experts (and appointing a neutral expert) violate due process under Ake?	Ake inapplicable because sanity was never at issue; a neutral court expert sufficed.	Ake entitles an indigent defendant to appointed psychiatric/mitigation experts to assist defense.	Denial of defense-funded experts did not violate due process; Ake’s threshold (sanity at issue) not met; neutral expert was adequate.
2) Was there sufficient evidence to find Keefe "irreparably corrupt" / permanently incorrigible?	The court adequately weighed Miller factors and could rely on offense severity and post-offense misconduct.	The court refused to consider unrebutted evidence of decades-long rehabilitation; Miller/Montgomery require considering rehabilitation at resentencing.	Reversed: District Court erred by refusing to consider positive post-offense rehabilitation evidence; remand for new resentencing to fully apply Miller factors.
3) Must a jury, under Apprendi, decide whether a juvenile is "irreparably corrupt" (i.e., fact increasing punishment)?	Apprendi does not apply; irreparable corruption is a mitigation/eligibility question for the judge.	A jury must find the factual predicate for a LWOP sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.	Rejected: Apprendi does not require a jury; determination whether juvenile is permanently incorrigible is for the sentencing judge.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional except for the rare permanently incorrigible youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announces substantive rule to be applied retroactively; juveniles must be given opportunity to show they are not irreparably corrupt)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders; foundational recognition of youth-related differences)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; youth differences carry across crimes)
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (indigent defendant entitled to access to competent psychiatric assistance when sanity is a significant issue)
McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017) (clarifies Ake thresholds and role of state-provided mental health experts)
United States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2019) (post-offense rehabilitation is highly probative and must be considered on resentencing for juvenile LWOP)
Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017) (Montana holds Miller/Montgomery principles apply to its sentencing scheme)