11 N.W.3d 394
Neb.2024Background
- Victim James Shekie was found shot to death in his trailer on Feb 23, 2021; shell casings and bullets recovered. Feilen and Marques (cooperating witnesses) implicated Deontae Rush, describing a planned robbery of Shekie’s drugs and Rush entering the trailer with a gun. Rush was arrested in Chicago and charged with first-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony.
- Law enforcement served a subpoena on Verizon for non‑location call/text records, then obtained warrants (Verizon, Facebook, Snapchat, and a phone) that produced more detailed records including cell‑site/location data and phone content. Rush filed multiple suppression motions; the district court denied them.
- The State sought a §27‑404 pretrial hearing to admit evidence that Rush was dealing marijuana; the court held the hearing, admitted hearsay at the hearing, and later admitted the other‑acts evidence at trial for motive.
- At trial the State introduced cooperating witness testimony, social‑media and phone messages, surveillance video, shoe/print comparisons, and cell‑tower/location data. Defense tried to present an alibi/domestic‑assault explanation but the key officer (Bruning) was not produced at trial amid subpoena service confusion. Defense did not object to several items at trial.
- Rush was convicted by a jury of first‑degree murder and use of a firearm; sentenced to life plus 25–35 years consecutively. He appealed multiple evidentiary rulings, alleged ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct in closing, and insufficiency of firearm evidence. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Rush's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were hearsay materials admissible at the §27‑404 hearing? | §27‑404 hearing is a preliminary hearing exempt from the rules of evidence; judge may consider hearsay to determine admissibility. | The rules of evidence apply; hearsay should have been excluded, so §27‑404 proof failed. | Court held §27‑404 hearings are preliminary under §27‑1101(4)(b); hearsay may be considered and the State proved the bad acts by clear and convincing evidence. |
| Admission of Shekie’s text messages to Brand (time stamps) | Relevant to establish time of last contact; court limited jury to dates/times. | Cumulative and potentially prejudicial. | Admission was within discretion; relevant and not an abuse of discretion. |
| Admission of photograph of Marques’ pressure sore | Photo corroborates Marques’ inability to walk and supports he wasn’t the shooter. | Photo was inflammatory and invited sympathy/unfair prejudice. | Probative value outweighed prejudice; trial court did not abuse discretion. |
| Admissibility of phone/location records obtained after subpoena and warrants | Subpoena sought non‑location metadata; third‑party doctrine applies; warrants for site‑location had independent probable cause and were lawful under Carpenter distinctions. | Subpoena was unlawful and tainted subsequent warrants; thus location data should be suppressed. | No warrantless cell‑site/location was obtained via subpoena; third‑party doctrine covers non‑location logs; warrants had independent probable cause; counsel not ineffective for failing to object; no plain error. |
| Investigator Fields’ identification of Rush in video | Fields had seen and interviewed Rush and compared clothing/appearance; identification was proper foundation; other witnesses also identified Rush. | Fields lacked sufficient personal knowledge to identify defendant in poor‑quality footage. | Foundation sufficient; challenges went to weight, not admissibility; counsel not ineffective and no plain error. |
| Admission of in‑life photograph of victim (smiling, hardhat) | Photo aids witness identification; admissible even if it humanizes victim. | Photo was unnecessary and unfairly prejudicial. | Photo admissible for identification; not unduly prejudicial; counsel not ineffective for not objecting. |
| Failure to secure Officer Bruning / alleged prosecutor interference / motion for mistrial & motion for new trial | State denies intentional interference; subpoena/service confusion occurred and defense knew Bruning wouldn’t appear; evidence of warrant would not have supplied an alibi. | Clerk and prosecution errors prevented presentation of corroborating evidence for Rush’s alibi; prosecutor misstated lack of corroboration in closing; mistrial/new trial warranted. | Record showed no prosecutorial misconduct or intentional interference; defense did not request continuance; motion for new trial lacked merit; counsel not ineffective for withdrawing motion. |
| Ineffective assistance re impeachment, witness preparation, and uncalled alibi witnesses | Many claims are conclusory or not supported by the record; some claims cannot be resolved on direct appeal because record lacks detail. | Trial counsel failed to adequately impeach Feilen, prepare Rush for testimony, and secure alibi witnesses (Young). | Impeachment claim insufficient (trial record showed extensive impeachment). Preparation and failure to call Young cannot be resolved on direct appeal—record inadequate. Other IAC claims lacked merit. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for use of a firearm to commit a felony | Circumstantial evidence (witnesses saw/said Rush had a gun, heard shots, shell casings found) supports firearm use element. | No physical evidence directly linking Rush to a firearm. | Viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, any rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rush used a firearm. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) (cell‑site location information over time may implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen‑register/third‑party doctrine: numbers dialed not a Fourth Amendment search)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- State v. Knutson, 288 Neb. 823 (2014) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in non‑location phone records held by carrier)
- State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364 (2014) (suppression hearings are preliminary hearings for evidentiary‑rule exemption)
- State v. Jennings, 305 Neb. 809 (2020) (discussed cell‑site location issues in light of Carpenter)
- State v. Esch, 315 Neb. 482 (2023) (§27‑404 analysis and requirement of clear and convincing proof at pretrial hearing)
- State v. Elias, 314 Neb. 494 (2023) (limited cell‑tower records for short period do not implicate Carpenter privacy concerns)
