State v. Rozell R. Cook, 364 Mont. 161

Cook pled guilty via Alford to two counts of felony sexual assault; sentenced to DOC with two concurrent 20-year terms, 10 years suspended, classified as a tier III sex offender with many suspended-term conditions.
State moved to revoke the suspended portion on June 17, 2010, two days before Cook’s scheduled release; district court revoked the suspended sentence and imposed two concurrent 10-year DOC commitments with five years suspended.
Cook timely appealed from the revocation order; this Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
The suspended sentence carried 25 conditions; four key ones included supervision by probation, counseling/evaluations, MSOTA-approved sex offender treatment, and residence within 1500 feet of school-related locations.
Cook’s pre-parole plan proposed residing with a sister-in-law in Great Falls, later deemed noncompliant with the 1500-foot zone; alternative housing and treatment options were pursued in Great Falls and Helena.
The District Court found violations of conditions 1 and 15, rejected condition 10 (treatment) as not MSOTA-qualified, and rejected other proposed alternatives, then added 16 new conditions includingGPS monitoring.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the court lack authority to revoke due to filing before suspension began?	Cook argues petition filed before commencement violates §46-18-203(2).	State contends Stiffarm applies prospectively and timing allowed revocation.	Stiffarm applies prospectively; court lacked authority to revoke under pre-start filing.
Was revocation abusive where violations were not willful?	Cook asserts due process requires alternatives; violations were not willful.	State contends violations occurred and due process does not require willfulness for revocation.	Court did not abuse discretion; nonwillful yet enough to revoke under standards.
Were the revocation conditions illegal or punitive beyond original sentence?	Cook challenges added conditions as punitive and exceeding original term.	State argues new/modified terms are permissible to achieve rehabilitation and public protection.	Most conditions upheld; one GPS condition stricken as impossible; others affirmed.

State v. Stiffarm, 359 Mont. 116 (2011 MT 9) (interprets timing of revocation petitions under §46-18-203(2))
State v. Haagenson, 356 Mont. 177 (2010 MT 95) (describes collateral nature of revocation proceedings)
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (requires due process consideration of alternatives when nonpayment involved)
State v. Tirey, 358 Mont. 510 (2010 MT 283) (balances punishment versus rehabilitative goals in revocation)
State v. Williams, 296 Mont. 258 (1999 MT 240) (reliance on availability of treatment and alternatives to imprisonment)
State v. Lee, 306 Mont. 173 (2001 MT 176) (due process considerations when state fails to provide treatment; alternatives)