*1 STATE MONTANA, OF Appellee,
Plaintiff and
GERALD J. STIFFARM,
Appellant.
Defendant
DANo.
10-0177.
January 20,
Submitted on Briefs
2011.
January 26,
Decided
2011.
For Missoula. General, Attorney Bullock, Montana Steve Appellee:
For Helena; General, Gina Attorney Wellenstein, Assistant Micheal S. Attorney, Hill Havre. Dahl, County Court. Opinion COTTER delivered
JUSTICE *2 (Stiffarm) District Judicial the Twelfth appeals Stiffarm Gerald ¶1 State filed the sentence because revoking suspended his Court’s order sentence. We of that beginning to the to revoke petition and remand. reverse
ISSUE Court the District appeal on is whether ofthe issue A restatement ¶2 of statutory authority, in violation exceeded considered, granted, petition the State’s when it that was filed before sentence suspended Stiffarm’s begun. BACKGROUND FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 26,2004, Stiffarm August On disputed. facts are not The material felony Partner agreement pled guilty plea into a entered (PFMA) He received in Cause No. DC-04-026. Member Assault Family 9, 2005, conformity in with on December suspended a sentence Failure 24,2006, guilty to February pled Stiffarm agreement. On plea Offender, felony, in Cause No. DC-06-010. a Register as Violent suspended Stiffarm’s sentence day, same the court revoked On that of his register was a violation PFMA Stiffarm’s failure because to the DC-04-026, Stiffarm was committed In Cause No. probation. DC-06-010, No. years. for four Cause of Corrections Department for five of Corrections Department committed to the Stiffarm was consecutively four-year to the sentence to run years, suspended, all in Cause No. DC-04-026. issued time, At the granted parole. was On June Stiffarm No. DC-04- serving four-year sentence Cause
Stiffarm still was 14, 2009. discharge until November was not due to DC-06-010 therefore sentence for Cause No. suspended Stiffarm’s 14, 2009. to run until at least November not commence would suspended Stiffarm’s days On 2009-four before November a Petition for Revocation begin-the State filed sentence was to No. DC-06-010 for violations Sentence Cause Suspended A was issued sentence. warrant conditions of the arrested. Stiffarm was On December Stiffarm moved to dismiss the revocation
petition on the basis that the was filed in violation of 46-18- 203(2), MCA. This statute provides: “[t]he for a revocation sentencing must be filed with the during court ofsuspension or deferral. Expiration period suspension ofthe or deferral after the petition is filed does not deprive jurisdiction the court of its to rule on petition.” argued that the revocation petition was filed sentence, commencement of his suspended in violation of the statute. The District evidentiary Court conducted an hearing
concluded Stiffarm had alleged committed the violations in the State’s petition. The court then briefing ordered on whether it could revoke Stiffarm’s suspended sentence for violations occurring prior to the start ofthe sentence. The parties and, briefed the issue January on 2010, the District Court denied Stiffarm’s motion to dismiss the State’s petition. sentence was revoked at a February 5, 2010 disposition hearing, and he was committed to the Department of Corrections for years, years five with three suspended. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW We *3 review district court’s decision to a suspended sentence for abuse of discretion and whether a preponderance of the supported evidence the Rovin, 16, court’s decision. State v. 2009 MT 23, 57, 201 349 Mont. However, P.3d 780. when the presented issue is whether the district court to specific action, take a the question is one of law and our plenary. review is Shockley, State v. 2001 MT 196, 306 Mont. 31 P.3d 350. We decide this case pursuant to this latter standard.
DISCUSSION Did the District Court statutory exceed its authority, violation considered, § when it of granted, the State’s sentence that was the suspension had filed before of begun? Stiffarm argues that the 46-18-203(2), District Court violated § MCA, granted when it a petition for revocation of his sentence that was filed prior to commencement of that sentence. Stiffarm acknowledges that previously we have interpreted this statute in a manner contrary argument to his v. Christofferson State, 518, 272 (1995), Mont. 901 P.2d 588 State v. 2000 MT
119
Morrison,
16, 341
228,
112,
225,
State v.
301 Mont.
276,
MT
LeDeau, 2009
147,
1027,
P.3d
and State v.
Mont.
cases,
argues
line of
Despite
statute, judge is to ascertain and declare what simply office therein, is in terms or in substance contained not to insert what has omitted 1-2-101, or omit what has been inserted.” Section MCA. Further, a according plain meaning, statute is to be construed and if clear no further unambiguous, is Fund, v. interpretation required. Geiger Employers’ is Uninsured (citations omitted). MT Mont. P.3d 259 As we stated, this repeatedly prerogative have it is not Court’s read into a there; appellate “[o]ur statute what is not function as an court is to carry Legislature’s by looking ascertain and out the intent at the meaning of Marriage Rudolf, the words in the In re statute.” Jett, Strzelczyk MT (quoting P.3d 907 (1994)). 153, 157, 870 730, 732-33 Further, if legislative plain meaning words, may intent can be by determined we *4 go no further other In re applying any interpretation. Archer, 82, 16, 1, 136 2006 MT 332 P.3d 563 (citing Mont. Western ¶ Revenue, 289, 11, 55, Co. 1999 Energy Dept. MT 297 Mont. 990 ¶ 767). P.2d 120 46-18-203(2), MCA, is clear and unambiguous.
It
petition
states that a
for revocation must be filed “during
of suspension
or deferral.” Section
MCA (emphasis
added). The meaning
“during”
“1: throughout
is:
the continuance or
of;
course
2:
point
of,”
at some
in the course
Webster’s Third New
(G.
Dictionary
International
1971),
703
& C. Merriam Co.
throughout
“1:
of;
the entire time
all through; 2: at some point in the
of;
entire time
in the course of.” Webster’s
College
New World
(4th
2002).
Dictionary
ed.,
443
Wiley Publishing
The plain meaning
46-18-203(2), MCA,
of §
is that the State
may properly file petition
a
a suspended
or deferred sentence
only after the sentence has commenced
concludes,
and before it
before and not
after the
of suspension or
Further,
deferral.
because this plain meaning
clear,
is
we need not-and cannot-inquire
further into the legislative
Formicove,
history.
N,
Inc. v. Burlington
189, 192,
207 Mont.
469, 470 (1983);
673 P.2d
Gatts,
State v.
279 Mont.
(1996).
928 P.2d
118
It
province
is the
Legislature
amend
if
this is not the meaning it intended.
argues
The State
that we should
very
defer to “the
weighty
considerations” of stare decisis and
precedent,
follow our
which has
recognized a district
court’s
to grant
a
to revoke a
suspended sentence that is filed
begins
before a defendant
serving that
sentence. While the doctrine of stare decisis is typically this Court’s
preferred course,
Kirkbride,
see State v.
178, 13,
2008 MT
343 Mont.
340;
Tonn,
Certain v.
MT
it is not such
rigid
doctrine that
it forecloses
reexamination of cases and requires us to
manifestly
follow “a
wrong
decision.” Allstate v. Wagner-Ellsworth,
Mont.
445,
LeDeau, correctly notes that the root of the errant line of cases the State urges us to lays follow with this Court’s uncritical continuing on, reliance of, re-affirmation State v. 395, 642 (1982) P.2d and Matter of Ratzlaff, 172 Mont. P.2d (1977). Both of these cases were decided 46-18-203, MCA, amended § in 1983 to add subsection (Nelson, LeDeau, J. dissenting); (Nelson, J. concurring dissenting). light of the amendment clearly expressly limited the time during which a filed, pre could be 1983 decisions addressing previous version of the statute without the *5 clearly inapposite considering time constraints are when the amended Nonetheless, wrongly rely continued to on Sullivan and statute. we MCA, post-1983 interpreted in caselaw and to § Ratzlaff permit grant-a petition a district court to consider-and suspended or deferred sentence that was filed before the defendant began serving the sentence. suspended Mont, at Christofferson, We did this for the first time in ¶17 Vallier, 901 P.2d at which was decided in 1995. In the 2000 case of unquestioningly accepted we the defendant’s concession that authority suspended prior district court had to revoke his sentence to commencement, its he based on Sullivan and Christofferson. Vallier, In Ratzlaff, Christofferson, 9. we reaffirmed Vallier, by and an impermissible interpretation legislative bolstered history and notwithstanding Justice Nelson’s dissent. 14- ¶¶ And, finally, 18. again upheld reading 2009 we this incorrect of 46-§ 18-203(2), MCA, Morrison, Sullivan, again relying on our decisions in LeDeau, and Ratzlaff, spite repeated and of Justice Nelson’s dissent. 21. The State not argue foregoing properly does that the cases were ¶18 46-18-203(2), MCA, decided under the plain language of because it § forthrightly Rather, cannot do simply urges so. it us to follow the conclude, however, precedent. duty We that we cannot reconcile our to apply legislation as written with the decisions in these cases. We LeDeau, Morrison, Vallier, accordingly expressly overrule and It is unnecessary to overrule Sullivan or Christofferson. Ratzlaff they because were decided to the 1983 enactment of 46-18- § 203(2), MCA, interpret statutory a different scheme.
CONCLUSION foregoing reasons, For the plain we hold that under the 46-18-203(2), MCA, meaning of statutory District Court lacked authority to revoke suspended Stiffarm’s sentence in Cause No. DC-06- 010 because the State filed for revocation before Stiffarm began serving suspended sentence. We therefore reverse and remand to the District Court with instruction to vacate the order revoking sentence in Cause No. DC-06-010. We also take opportunity urge this the Montana Legislature clarify 46-18-203(2), MCA, amend and should the reads, this statute as it now be inconsistent with its intent. Reversed and Remanded. McGRATH,
CHIEF NELSON, JUSTICES JUSTICES WHEAT and MORRIS concur. BAKER, dissenting.
JUSTICE
noted, “weighty
majority
As the
has
respectfully
I
dissent.
lightly
that courts should
principle
underlie the
considerations
Allstate,
v. States Marine
(citing Moragne
decisions.”
past
overrule
(1970)).
S. Ct.
Inc., 398 U.S.
Lines
‘\S~\tare
reflects our concerns
a fundamental doctrine which
decisis is
Formicove,
treatment” in the law.
stability,
equal
predictability
great
with
principle applies
P.2d at 472. This
Ford,
Bottomly v.
statutes. See
interpreting
force in
LeDeau, Morrison,
Christofferson,
we examined §
District
the statute to allow the
interpreted
before
or deferred sentence
Court the
*6
LeDeau, 21; Morrison,
16;
began serving that sentence.
¶
a defendant
Mont,
9;
at
error, Tennessee, 501 U.S. 111 S. Ct. Payne v. (1991), interpretation the Court’s of the statute’s new However, “judicial construction of a language cannot be faulted. legislation from the time of its enactment.” part statute becomes Singer Singer, J. and J.D. Shambie Sutherland Statutes Norman (7th Construction, 2B, 49:5,32-34 ed., Statutory Thompson-West vol. 2008). of the statute was Whether this Court’s initial construction not, Co. v. Great it has become the law. Mont. Horse Prods. correct 919,927 legislature’s It is the Ry., N. Court’s, if the Court’s change not the statute prerogative, legislature of its is not what longstanding interpretation intended. dissenting ofJUSTICE BAKER. joins Opinion
JUSTICE RICE