305 Ga. 442
Ga.2019Background
- In December 2015 Jennifer and Joseph Rosenbaum were arrested and police lawfully seized their two iPhones, an iPad, and a MacBook incident to arrest and via vehicle impound; the devices were placed in the Henry County property room.
- The State did not obtain search warrants to examine the data on the devices until May–November 2017; the first warrants were issued 539 days after seizure and the last at 702 days.
- Defense repeatedly requested return/access to the devices; investigators and prosecutors gave varying testimony about when they learned devices existed and when defense requests were made; the trial court found the devices “sat in the evidence room undisturbed until May 26, 2017.”
- The trial court suppressed all evidence derived from the devices, applying the Eleventh Circuit framework for unreasonable delay in securing warrants (Mitchell/Laist) and rejecting a Leon good-faith exception under Georgia law (citing Gary).
- The State appealed; the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the Eleventh Circuit balancing test, reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, and affirmed suppression.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Rosenbaum's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State properly invoked appellate procedure for pretrial suppression order | Appeal properly filed under OCGA §5-7-1(a)(4) (suppressing illegally obtained evidence) | State must meet special certification under subsection (a)(5) (argument raised by defense) | Appeal was properly brought under OCGA §5-7-1(a)(4); certification under (a)(5) not required |
| Whether the long delay between seizure and obtaining warrants rendered searches unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment | Delay was explainable by investigative complexity and reassignments; warrants cured defects | 539–702 day delay was unreasonable, investigators were not diligent, and defendants repeatedly sought return/access | Applying Eleventh Circuit factors (Mitchell/Laist) court found delay unreasonable; suppression affirmed |
| Whether defendants’ possessory interest and efforts to obtain return affect reasonableness | State minimized defendants’ requests and argued possessory interest lessened by investigatory needs | Defendants had substantial possessory interest and made repeated requests for return/access; interest was materially affected | Trial court’s finding that defendants’ possessory interest was substantially interfered with was supported by the record |
| Whether evidence should be admitted under good-faith exception despite unreasonable delay | Good-faith reliance on later warrants or neutral magistrate should allow admission | Georgia law (OCGA §17-5-30 as interpreted in Gary) bars Leon good-faith exception; facts do not support objective good faith | Leon exception does not apply in Georgia under Gary; here facts also undermine any good-faith claim; suppression stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009) (framework recognizing that a seizure lawful at inception may violate the Fourth Amendment if delay in obtaining a warrant is unreasonable)
- United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608 (11th Cir. 2012) (articulates factors to balance: significance of possessory interference, duration of delay, consent, and government’s interest)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (establishes the federal good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule)
- Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (Ga. 1992) (holds OCGA §17-5-30 precludes application of the Leon good-faith exception in Georgia)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (U.S. 2014) (recognizes high privacy interests in cell phone contents and generally requires a warrant to search digital data)
- United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2012) (refuses Leon exception for unreasonable delays and considers whether defendant asserted possessory interest)