State v. Roscoe, 198 A.3d 1232

Background

1990 death of 85‑year‑old Mrs. Mouchon; autopsy found blunt‑force injuries and sperm; DNA testing decades later linked defendant Roscoe to the sperm.
Criminal trial held in 2016; central factual issue was whether sexual contact was consensual.
Several witnesses who had been interviewed during the 1990 investigation (including the victim’s son and neighbors) died before trial; the lead 1990 detective (Bousquet) testified about having interviewed them but their actual answers were not elicited.
Prosecutor’s closing argument included: an awkward reference to "hearsay rules" (suggesting the jury couldn’t be told certain things), an asserted paraphrase/inference from the medical examiner that the assault caused cardiac arrest, and repeated inflammatory references that defense counsel had called the victim a "slut" and a "whore."
Dr. Garrity (medical examiner) testified that cause of death was cardiac arrest following blunt‑force trauma and, after learning investigative facts (sperm, lack of relationship), opined manner of death was homicide; trial court admitted that opinion.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the admission of testimonial out‑of‑court statements (readily inferable from Bousquet’s testimony and the prosecutor’s argument) violated the Confrontation Clause; conviction vacated and case remanded for new trial. Concurring opinions also urged reversal based on the prosecutor’s inflammatory closing remarks.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Roscoe)	Held
Prosecutor's closing remarks (calls victim a "slut/whore") — mistrial?	Remarks were within latitude of closing and cured by jury instruction.	Remarks were inflammatory, untethered to record, and merited mistrial or reversal.	Remarks were improper and exceeded bounds; trial court’s cautionary instruction noted but majority did not base reversal solely on them; concurring justices would order new trial on this ground.
Prosecutor reference to "hearsay rules" in closing — prejudicial suggestion of withheld inculpatory evidence?	Comment was an ineloquent explanation of complex DNA testing and not inviting speculation.	Comment suggested state had inculpatory evidence withheld from jury.	Court found the remark distinguishable from impermissible appeals to speculation (Bolden); no reversible error.
Prosecutor’s characterization of medical examiner’s testimony (attributing a quote implying assault caused cardiac arrest) — misstatement?	Prosecutor drew a reasonable inference from Dr. Garrity’s hypothetical answer and testimony.	Prosecutor misquoted/misrepresented expert testimony to the jury.	Court held the prosecutor’s characterization was a permissible inference from testimony and within allowable latitude; trial judge also instructed jury that arguments are not evidence.
Admission of detective testimony and prosecutor argument that allowed jury to infer deceased witnesses’ statements — Confrontation Clause?	State conceded those 1990 statements were testimonial but argued content did not directly inculpate defendant; any error was harmless.	Testimony and argument permitted the jury to readily infer testimonial statements of unavailable declarants, depriving Roscoe of confrontation and cross‑examination.	Court held Confrontation Clause violated when testimonial out‑of‑court statements could be "readily inferred"; error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction vacated and remanded for new trial.

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements of absent witnesses inadmissible without prior cross‑examination)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (test for whether statements are testimonial: primary purpose to establish past events for prosecution)
Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (no third category of testimonial witnesses immune from confrontation)
Kizzee v. United States, 877 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2017) (questions designed to permit jury to readily infer content of nontestifying declarant’s statements violate Confrontation Clause)
State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2012) (trial judge’s front‑row vantage and discretion on mistrial rulings)
State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984 (R.I. 2008) (prosecutorial latitude in closing argument; jury instruction effect)
State v. Fortes, 922 A.2d 143 (R.I. 2007) (prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from witness testimony)
State v. Albanese, 970 A.2d 1215 (R.I. 2009) (Confrontation Clause harmless‑error framework)
State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1981) (limits on expert opinion founded solely on anecdotal history that mirrors witness testimony)
State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 1992) (medical examiner testimony on cause/manner of death may assist jury when based on independent forensic foundation)
State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376 (R.I. 2015) (no precise formula delimiting prosecutor’s closing argument)
State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002) (prosecutorial latitude in argument)
State v. Commander, 721 S.E.2d 413 (S.C. 2011) (anecdotal history is essential to autopsy interpretation and may support admissible opinion)
State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015) (exclude medical‑examiner opinion when based primarily on uncorroborated witness statements)
State v. Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d 917 (Ariz. App. 2012) (exclude medical examiner opinion that largely rests on lay testimony)
State v. Vining, 645 A.2d 20 (Me. 1994) (medical examiner’s manner‑of‑death opinion based solely on police discussions was improper)