State v. Robinson, 498 S.W.3d 914

Background

Olin Robinson was convicted of assault on a public servant and began serving his four-year sentence on December 28, 2011; he filed a motion for "shock probation" that same day.
The trial court granted shock probation on February 2, 2012; the State appealed for lack of a hearing as required by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12 § 6(c).
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing; mandate issued August 13, 2013.
The trial court held the required § 6(c) hearing on October 21, 2013 and again granted shock probation; the State appealed this second order.
The court of appeals held the second order void because more than 180 days had elapsed since execution of sentence began; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review.
The Court held (1) the State may appeal an order granting shock probation under Art. 44.01(a)(2) as an order that "arrests or modifies a judgment," and (2) the State’s notice of appeal tolled the trial court’s 180-day jurisdictional period, so the October 21, 2013 order was valid.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Robinson)	Held
Whether the court of appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction over the State’s appeal of the grant of shock probation	State: Article 44.01 authorizes appeals from orders that "arrest or modify a judgment," so the State may appeal	Robinson: Shock probation is discretionary/nonreviewable; no direct appeal from a grant of probation	Held: State may appeal under Art. 44.01(a)(2); granting shock probation modifies the judgment and is appealable
Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant shock probation after the appellate mandate issued, given the 180-day limit in Art. 42.12 § 6(a)	State: 180-day jurisdiction runs continuously from start of execution; actions after 180 days are void	Robinson: Time was tolled while the State’s appeal was pending; remand restored parties to pre-appeal posture	Held: The State’s appeal suspended trial-court proceedings under Art. 44.01(e); the 180-day period was tolled during the appeal, so the October 21, 2013 order was timely
Whether the proper remedy for an unauthorized shock-probation grant is appeal or mandamus	State: mandamus may be proper for purely ministerial corrections	Robinson: appeal is available and was used	Held: Appeal is available under Art. 44.01(a)(2); mandamus remains an option in appropriate cases but is not exclusive
Whether applying Art. 42.12 § 6 literally (without harmonizing Art. 44.01) would lead to absurd results	State: literal reading enforces 180-day limit strictly	Robinson: literal reading would let the State defeat any timely- filed shock-probation request by appealing and causing expiration	Held: Statutes must be harmonized; Art. 44.01(e) stay prevents an absurd result and preserves defendants’ ability to obtain shock probation when appeal tolls the period

Key Cases Cited

State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (notice of appeal invokes appellate jurisdiction)
Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (appeal authorized if statute permits; focus on whether appeal is authorized, not precluded)
State v. Gutierrez, 129 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Art. 44.01 allows State to appeal orders that reduce a defendant’s sentence)
Collins v. State, 240 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (order modifying judgment nunc pro tunc is appealable by State)
State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing State’s appellate challenge to trial court’s authority to grant shock probation)
State v. Posey, 330 S.W.3d 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (affirming that State may challenge trial court’s authority to grant shock probation)
State ex rel. Bryan v. McDonald, 642 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (holding trial court lost jurisdiction after the statutory period expired and orders entered after that are void)
State ex rel. Vance v. Hatten, 600 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (mandamus is appropriate to set aside void shock-probation orders)
State ex rel. Thomas v. Banner, 724 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (mandamus to vacate orders when judge lacks statutory authority to grant shock probation)
Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (trial court’s discretion to grant or deny community supervision to eligible defendants is generally unreviewable)