State v. Robinson
263 P.3d 1233
Wash.2011Background
- Robinson pled guilty to first-degree burglary and entered a Barr plea to third-degree rape after negotiations focused on an offender score; he believed his juvenile convictions had washed out and would not count toward sentencing.
- Law changed while he was incarcerated; his 1994 murder conviction and four juvenile convictions began to count toward offender score under the current framework.
- Before sentencing, discovery of undisclosed juvenile convictions increased the standard ranges for burglary and rape, nearly tripling the negotiated ranges.
- Robinson moved to withdraw the plea four days before sentencing, arguing a legal mistake rendered the plea not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent.
- The trial court granted withdrawal, finding reasonable but erroneous belief about the law and manifest injustice; the State appealed, Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review to resolve the governing standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether withdrawal was proper for manifest injustice given discovery of additional criminal history | Robinson argues withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. | State argues no manifest injustice; Codiga governs risk allocation for undisclosed history. | Yes; manifest injustice supported withdrawal; no abuse of discretion. |
| Whether Codiga controls and limits the defendant's ability to withdraw | Robinson relied on Codiga’s framework to show a legal error affected knowingness. | State contends Codiga supports withdrawal where attorneys miscalculate; here the plea was not knowing. | Codiga governs; trial court erred by not applying it properly. |
| Timing of the motion to withdraw and its impact on the due process assessment | Robinson moved promptly after discovering the error. | State argues timing should be weighed but does not alone prove manifest injustice. | Timing supports the finding of manifest injustice; timely motion weighs in favor. |
| Whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent given the undisclosed history | Defendant’s belief about washed-out juvenile history undermined knowingness. | Plea agreement explicitly included juvenile history; defendant knowingly signed. | Plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the circumstances. |
| Whether enforcing the plea would undermine confidence in the justice system | Respecting the incorrect assumption would undermine fairness. | Manifest injustice required corrective action only when plainly unjust. | No manifest injustice if properly applied; but here manifest injustice favored withdrawal. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Codiga, 162 Wash.2d 912 (2008) (defendant not burdened with legal mistake when history is correct but miscalculated by counsel; plea withdrawal allowed only for manifest injustice)
- State v. A.N.J., 168 Wash.2d 91 (2010) (timing of motion considered; manifest injustice standard applied to withdrawal)
- State v. LaChapelle, 153 Wash.2d 1 (2004) (current offender score rules control; washed-out history considered unless law fixes it retroactively)
- State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179 (2004) (legislature intended to include previously washed convictions in offender score)
- State v. Taylor, 83 Wash.2d 594 (1974) (manifest injustice standard and plea withdrawal framework origin)
- State v. Zhao, 157 Wash.2d 188 (2006) (prevalence of manifest injustice standard for plea withdrawal)
