358 P.3d 776
Idaho Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Robert Williston pled guilty, under a plea agreement, to attempted strangulation (I.C. § 18-923) after his wife reported being slapped, kicked and choked; the domestic battery charge was dismissed.
- Two weeks before sentencing Williston moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
- Williston asserted he was unaware the attempted-strangulation component required specific intent and claimed defense counsel told him touching the victim’s neck would support a conviction.
- The charging document alleged Williston “willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle” the victim by wrapping his hands around her throat and squeezing.
- The district court rejected Williston’s credibility, found the plea colloquy and charging information showed he understood the choke-component elements, denied the motion to withdraw, and sentenced him to a unified 12-year term (8-year minimum).
- On appeal the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that Williston failed to show a just reason to withdraw his plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williston) | Defendant's Argument (State / District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williston’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary | He did not understand the specific-intent element of the attempted-strangulation component and was misinformed by counsel that mere touching could convict him | Charging document and plea colloquy put him on notice of the choke component (general intent); his courtroom statements and conduct show he read/understood the charge; his counsel’s alleged advice was not credible | Plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; denial of withdrawal affirmed |
| Whether I.C. § 18-923 requires specific intent for both statutory components | Statutory language and prior case law (per Williston’s reading of Laramore) require specific intent to injure for the choke component too | The statute creates two means: (1) "choke" (general intent — willfully and unlawfully) and (2) "attempt to strangle" (attempt crime requiring specific intent) | Only the attempted-strangulation component requires specific intent; the choke component requires general intent |
| Whether the charging document was constitutionally sufficient to inform Williston of the elements | He claims it failed to explain the specific-intent element of the attempted-strangulation alternative | The charge tracked the statute and alleged conduct that plainly described choking (actus reus); because the state could convict on the choke theory (general intent), no specific-intent explanation was necessary | The charging document was sufficient; it informed Williston of the choke component and its elements |
| Whether Williston’s allegation of ineffective or misleading counsel justified plea withdrawal pre-sentence | Counsel told him he could be convicted for mere touching; this misinformation vitiated voluntariness | Trial court found Williston not credible; record contradicted his claims (he declined to have charge read, acknowledged understanding, declined extended time) | Court of Appeals defers to trial-court credibility findings and rejects the claim; no just reason to withdraw plea |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Laramore, 179 P.3d 1084 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (discusses differing mental elements for the "choke" and "attempt to strangle" components and rejects facial vagueness challenge)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (charging document need only set forth elements in words of the statute to inform defendant of nature of charge)
- Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005) (a guilty plea must be voluntary and with awareness of the elements of the offense)
- State v. Dopp, 861 P.2d 51 (Idaho 1993) (defendant bears burden to show a just reason to withdraw a pre-sentence guilty plea; failure to present a plausible reason counsels denial)