Lead Opinion
BACKGROUND
This аppeal involves four criminal cases. The first three cases arose from incidents that occurred late in the evening of April 21, 1989. On that date the defendant, wearing only a shirt, assaulted a 22-year old female as she was walking down the sidewalk on the street where she lived. As the woman strove to fight Dopp off, he struck her, knocked her down, tore at her clothing and attempted to drag her into a nearby residence. As the victim’s husband approached the scеne, Dopp fled to another nearby home where an older couple lived. When the wife answered Dopp’s knock on the door, Dopp forced his way into the home. As the husband came to his wife’s aid, Dopp began to fight with the husband. During the struggle, Dopp struck the husband in the head with the butt of a shotgun. The couple was able to escape to the home of a neighbor where they called the police. The police found and arrested Dopp shortly after they arrived on the scene. Later, the police found Dopp’s car parked in a nearby alley. In the car they found Dopp’s pants, underwear, shoes, and certain quantities of cocaine and marijuana as well as other drug paraphernalia.
These incidents precipitated the commencement of three criminal cases. In the case stemming from Dopp’s assault on the younger female (Case No. 89-4-642), Dopp was bound over to the district court on a charge of battery with the intent to commit rape. In the case stemming from Dopp’s attack on the older couple (Case No. 89-4-635), Dopp was bound over for trial on a charge of aggravated battery. In the case stemming from the drugs found in Dopp’s car (Case No. 89-5-807), Dopp was bound over for trial on a charge of possession of cocaine.
The fourth criminal case (Case No. 89-1410) arose from events which оccurred on August 8, 1989, about three weeks after Dopp’s release on bail. On that date Dopp assaulted a 16-year old girl by tying her up, injecting her with a chemical substance alleged to have been cocaine, and then sexually assaulting her. As a result of this incident, Dopp was bound over for trial on six counts: first-degree kidnapping, felonious administering of drugs, battery with intent to commit the infamous crime against nature and rape, attempted rape, and two counts of the infamous crime against nature.
On May 9, 1990, Dopp entered into a written plea agreement with the state. Pursuant to this agreement, on May 10, Dopp entered pleas of guilty to the following charges: Case No. 89-4-642, battery with intent to commit a serious felony; Case No. 89-4-635, aggravated battery; Case No. 89-5-807, possession of a controlled substance, cocaine; Case No. 89-1410, second-degree kidnapping, felonious administering of drugs, and one count of infamous crime against nature. Although Dopp entered guilty pleas to the charges in cases 89-4-642 and 89-1410, he continued to assert his legal innocence with respect to those crimes. Dopp’s pleas to the aggravated battery and possession of drugs charges were unconditional admissions of guilt. In exchange, the State reduced the charges accordingly, and agreed to recom
Several weeks prior to the entry of these pleas, appellant refused to consume any food for the period of March 16-22, 1990. On March 23, 1990, appellant attempted to hang himself from the bars of his jail cell. A mental health consultant called to the jail shortly thereafter evaluated appellant as very stressed, angry, and frustrated. Appellant was then moved into segregation status and placed under аn acute-suicide watch. On April 11, 1990, appellant was upgraded to a 30-minute watch — the same watch given all inmates.
On May 31, 1990, Dopp filed a motion under I.C.R. 33(c) to withdraw all of his guilty pleas. A hearing was held on the motion on June 25. At the hearing, Dopp asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because at the time he entered the plea bargain his mental state was not “right” and because he never admitted that he committed the crimes charged. On October 2, 1990, the district court denied Dopp’s motion. On January 9, 1991, the district court sentenced Dopp in accordance with the State’s recommendations.
Dopp appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
1. whether appellant entered his guilty pleas knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently; and
2. whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw a guilty pleas.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Sato v. Schossberger,
If, as in this case, the issues presented to the Court of Appeals concerned a decision of a district court, we consider the correctness of thе district court’s decision. While we value the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the insight it gives us in addressing the issues presented on appeal, we do not focus on the opinion of the Court of Appeals, but rather on the decision of the district court.
The standard of review on appeal in cases where a defendant has attempted to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the district court has properly exercised judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Carrasco,
ANALYSIS
I.
KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, & INTELLIGENT GUILTY PLEA
Dopp has asserted that because he was under severe emotional stress prior to entering his guilty pleas, he did not enter those pleas voluntarily. At the hearing on his plea withdrawal motion, Dopp attempted to support this argument by introducing evidence to show that he had refused to eat food for about six days between March 16 and 22, 1990, and also that he tried to commit suicide on March 23, 1990. Dopp believes that, in light of his continual assertion оf legal innocence, the extreme emotional stress suffered prior to entry of his guilty pleas, and the release of said stress after May 10, the pleas were not made as a result of a voluntary act.
Before a trial court may accept a plea of guilty, I.C.R. 11(c) requires that the record of the entire proceedings, including
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty he would waive his right against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront witnesses against him.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against him.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment.
I.C.R. 11(c). Accordingly, the determination that a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently involves a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Carrasco,
At the hearing at which the defendant entered his guilty pleas, the district judge read each count to which the defendant would be pleading guilty and reviewed with him the elements of each offense. The defendant acknowledged that he understood the charges, that the pleas were voluntary, and that he was not being compelled to enter them. Dopp’s sole basis for his contention that his pleas were not voluntary, his mental instability, is contradicted by the testimony of David Doten, the mental therapist, who testified that Dopp was neither severely depressed nor at all mentally ill during April or May of 1990. Doten stated that Dopp was very luсid, oriented, and competent.
When asked on cross-examination at the plea withdrawal hearing what was different about his mental state or perspective at the time of his motion to withdraw as compared to the time of his plea inscription, Dopp consistently answered that, after thinking about it, he would rather take it to trial. Indeed, Dopp’s testimony reveals that his primary motivation for wanting to withdraw his pleas was because he initially believed he wоuld get a lighter sentence by entering the plea bargain, and he subsequently changed his mind and believed his chances of getting a lighter sentence would be better if he went to trial and submitted the case to a jury. Dopp never presented any evidence to show that on May 10, 1990, he was mentally incompetent to enter a voluntary plea of guilty. In fact, he explicitly acknowledged on cross-examination that he had understood the charges. Appellant doеs not contend that he was coerced, or that he did not understand his rights, or that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty. Dopp testified that he fully understood the charges against him when he entered the guilty pleas, that he understood the possible sentence he could receive, that he reviewed the plea bargain agreement before he signed it, and that he had discussed the agreement daily with his attorney for at least a week prior to еntering the agreement. The rec
II.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Dopp argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his pleas because (1) he never аdmitted committing the acts constituting the elements of the crime charged, and (2) the state would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal.
Withdrawal of a presentence guilty plea is not an automatic right, State v. Lavy,
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
The rule distinguishes between pleas made prior to and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure of proof for presen-tence motions. The first case to interpret and apply I.C.R. 33(c) (then I.C.R. 32(d)) was State v. Jackson,
Later cases applying I.C.R. 33(c) to presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea set оut a two-part test. First, defendants seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea, and second, “[o]nce the defendant has met this burden, the state may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating that prejudice would result from withdrawal of the plea.” State v. Hawkins,
We next turn to appellant’s motion concerning the conditional guilty pleas. The Jackson case, which preceded the evolution of the two-step inquiry employed in Ballard and Hawkins, dictates the conclusion that a trial court must grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea where such plea does not admit the facts of the charge. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas in case nos. 89-4-642 and 89-1410 is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding.
However, the harsh mandate harbored in Jackson has been somewhat tempered by subsequent cases coursing a less strident vein under the auspices of I.C.R. 33(c) and Fed.Rules of Crim.Proc. 32(d). Federal cases hold generally that a defendant who enters an Alford-type plea is not “willy nilly” entitled to withdraw it, as this would render inconsequent the guilty plea. See United States v. Barker,
No costs on appeal.
Notes
. In Jackson, the defendant pled guilty to the crime charged but, like Dopp, refused to admit the commission of the acts constituting the crime. Jackson,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the result.
While, in this one justice’s view, the Court should not be “hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine, a defense, or a holding in a case, has been proven over time to be unjust or unwise,” Salinas v. Vierstras,
Justice Johnson who dissented in part in Guzman performed an admirable service in synthesizing this Court’s decisions regarding the doctrine of stare decisis when he said that
[f]rom these “precedents” we can glean that prior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise. While I am preрared to accept these limitations on the rule of stare decisis, I am not prepared to allow these limitations to convert the precedents of this Court into ephemeral edicts that are here today and gone tomorrow, the duration of their lifespan depending on the composition and disposition of the Court. This is not to say that I am unwilling to overrule precedent that is manifestly wrong.
Given the recent and fervent adulation at the altar of stare decisis, it might be expected that the majority opinion would' make an offering which would forcefully demonstrate how State v. Jackson was “manifestly wrong” and would additionally establish the “compelling and cogent reasons” which are needed in order to depart from our prior rulings. Instead, the majority’s explanation of why Jackson must be overruled is as “ephemeral” as that case itself now appears to be.
I.
Initially, it should be noted that this is not an example of a single aberrant case existing outside the mainstream of the law. In that case, the overruling of the rogue case would be more of a housekeeping matter and thus not subject to the “unjust or unwise” test. Here, to the contrary, a review of the Idaho cases cited by the majority shows those cases are cоnsistent with and do not undermine the Jackson rule. In State v. Lavy,
Although State v. Hawkin,
In short, Jackson is firmly in the mainstream of the law. Thus some “compelling and cogent reason” must exist to overrule it.
II.
The majority, however, can muster only one infirm reason why Jackson should be overruled, to wit: “The utility of Alford pleas will be severely reduced if defendants are permitted to withdraw them before sentencing for no additional reason.”
The majority, apparently oblivious to the concept of cause and effect, blithely trips along to make the following statement: “[s]uch a holding [i.e. not overruling Jackson ] might well lead to a reluctance on the part of prosecutors and judges to agree to the acceptance of such pleas.” Id.,
As might be expected in this case, neither the State nor the majority has pointed to one iota of evidence, either empirical or anecdotal, about what the effect of Jackson has been on Alford pleas. However, I suspect that if the effect of Jackson is as pervasive and profound as the majority suggests, the Court would have heard about it sometime during the nearly twenty years which have lapsed since that case was annоunced. If the kind of baseless speculation engaged in by the majority is now all that is needed to overcome stare decisis, then an “open season” sign has been declared which can only tend to expose existing case law precedent to unwarranted attacks.
This justice would not overrule Jackson because there is no reason, much less a “compelling and cogent reason,” to do so.
III.
Additionally, because Jackson is soundly premised upon solid constitutional considerations, and because Jackson protects the аccused’s right to a jury trial along with the other constitutional rights appurtenant thereto it should remain unmolested. The rights created by the United States Constitution exist to check the power of the state and thereby protect every citizen’s liberty. The minor inconvenience borne by trial courts and the state in cases like Jackson and Dopp’s case now before us, is so inconsequential that no sensible person would subvert those fundamental and cherished rights merely to avоid such a minor annoyance. Ironically, it is the majority who now creates a “harsh mandate” by holding that a claim of actual innocence is not a substantial enough reason to withdraw a guilty plea even if that motion is made prior to sentencing and there is no prejudice to the state. What must be kept firm
Instead of overruling cases “willy nilly,” the majority should temper today’s opinion and “course a less strident vein under the auspices” of stare decisis.
. One justice was of the opinion that the unconstitutional and immoral execution of another human being was a sufficiently “compelling and cogent reason” to overrule an obviously erroneous decision less than a year old, but neither Justice Johnson nor Justice McDevitt agreed. State v. Card,
. In my view, it is more likely that the utility of Alford, pleas will be “severely reduced" by the majority's opinion because now defendants have less incentive to enter those pleas. Thus the majority’s criticism of Jackson more logically applies to the majority’s opinion.
.