State v. Robert Grimpson Smith
154 A.3d 660
| N.H. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 2, 2014, police responded to a collapsed woman (Kerry St. Lawrence) outside 14 Bank Street, a rooming house with 8–10 numbered, lockable rooms and shared kitchen/bathroom.
- Sergeant Norris entered the building through the usually open front door, found defendant unconscious in room 1, and observed drug paraphernalia in plain view; defendant and St. Lawrence told EMTs they had used heroin.
- Officers requested consent to search room 1; consent was refused, so they obtained a warrant and seized a syringe, a plastic spoon with cotton, and a metal spoon (metal spoon had trace heroin).
- Defendant was charged with possession of heroin and moved to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal warrantless entry into the building’s common hallway.
- Defense investigator interviewed St. Lawrence pretrial; she made equivocal statements ("pleading the Fifth"; "her apartment, her name on the lease and her items in the apartment"). The court excluded that testimony as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 804(b)(3).
- Trial court denied suppression and excluded the investigator’s testimony; defendant was convicted and appealed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Smith's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of warrantless entry into building/common hallway | Norris’s entry was lawful because defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway; entry fell within implied license/social norms (and was not a trespass under Jardines) | Entry through the front door and into the common hallway invaded defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy; trespassory intrusion (Jardines) rendered the search unconstitutional | Court held defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway given building usage (many tenants, numbered locked rooms, open front door); implied license justified entry; no unlawful trespass under federal or state constitutions — suppression denied |
| Admissibility of investigator’s testimony recounting St. Lawrence’s statements | Statements were unreliable and not admissible as statements against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3); declarant was unavailable and the statements were vague and made after invoking Fifth | Statements tended to show St. Lawrence claimed items as hers, which would be against her penal interest and thus admissible to exculpate Smith | Court excluded the statements: they were too vague, non-specific, and made in circumstances (invoking Fifth, delayed interview with defense investigator) that undermined trustworthiness; exclusion was sustainable |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (trespass/curtilage analysis: physical intrusion onto curtilage to conduct a search can violate Fourth Amendment)
- United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 2011) (focus on tenants’ living arrangements to determine privacy expectations in rooming-house common areas)
- State v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46 (2003) (New Hampshire recognizes heightened privacy protection for the home under Part I, Article 19)
- State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810 (1984) (privacy interest in an apartment is comparable to that in a home)
- State v. Mouser, 168 N.H. 19 (2015) (New Hampshire recognizes trespass theory under federal Fourth Amendment and discusses trespass test)
- United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court holding privacy interest begins at individual room door, not the rooming-house front door)
