State v. Roat
466 P.3d 439
| Kan. | 2020Background
- Tony R. Roat pleaded guilty in two separate cases (2009 criminal threat; 2011 possession) and was sentenced using a criminal-history score that relied on a 1984 Kansas burglary classification as a person felony.
- Roat’s probation was revoked in the first case; he received a combined term of incarceration and completed all prison and post-release supervision by February 28, 2015.
- While serving, Roat filed motions to correct illegal sentences arguing the prior conviction was miscored under later cases (Murdock and Dickey); district court denied relief and Roat appealed.
- After Roat completed his sentence, the State notified the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot; Roat argued the appeal was needed to preserve a legal-malpractice claim and to prevent adverse effects on future sentencing.
- The Kansas Supreme Court granted review, analyzed the mootness doctrine (prudential vs. jurisdictional), evaluated Roat’s asserted collateral interests, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Roat) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roat’s sentencing-appeal is moot after he completed his sentence | Appeal is not moot because relief could affect future rights and preserve ability to sue trial counsel for malpractice | Appeal is moot because Roat fully served sentence and any reversal would be ineffectual to alter past confinement | Appeal is moot; completion of sentence makes direct relief ineffectual, so dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the possibility of a legal-malpractice claim preserves the appeal | A favorable appellate ruling is necessary to bring malpractice suit (avoid res judicata and show sentence was illegal) | Hypothetical malpractice claim is speculative and insufficient to defeat mootness; Roat failed to plead a nonfrivolous malpractice theory | Malpractice prospect insufficient—Roat did not identify an adequate, nonfrivolous malpractice theory, so it does not prevent mootness |
| Whether collateral consequences or future sentencing reliance prevent mootness | Future courts might rely on journal entries or prior scoring, harming Roat’s future sentencing | Statutes and precedent require future courts to allow objections and proof; mere speculation about future reliance is insufficient | Speculative collateral consequences and abstract interest in a “correct sentence” do not defeat mootness |
| Effect of 2019 amendment to K.S.A. 22-3504 on Roat’s appeal | Amendment allowing correction "at any time while defendant is serving sentence" could affect access to relief | Amendment is procedural and does not revive motions already filed while serving or change vested appellate rights materially here | Amendment does not change outcome; Roat filed while serving and had vested right to appeal—amendment does not rescue this appeal from mootness |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837 (2012) (articulates the three-part test for mootness and that an appeal is moot only if judgment would be ineffectual for any purpose)
- State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312 (2014) (addressed criminal-history scoring issues later relied on by Roat)
- State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 (2015) (clarified application of prior convictions in criminal-history calculations)
- Garcia v. Ball, 303 Kan. 560 (2015) (held motion to correct illegal sentence is proper mechanism to establish error for later malpractice claims)
- Canaan v. Bartee, 276 Kan. 116 (2003) (criminal defendant may sue counsel for malpractice but must obtain postconviction relief first)
- State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529 (2008) (district court may consider PSI criminal-history worksheet as evidence but defendant may object and State must then prove prior convictions)
- Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982) (expiration of sentence can render habeas claims moot absent sufficient collateral consequences)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (presumption of collateral consequences does not apply where appellant challenges only an expired sentence)
- Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (recognized collateral consequences of conviction may avoid mootness)
- St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943) (mere stigma or abstract injury is insufficient to avoid mootness)
