State v. Rivera
2017 Ohio 8514
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Ten defendants in a large drug-distribution indictment retained the same private law firm (Bradley & Stepanik) to represent them in Lorain County common pleas court.
- The State moved to disqualify Bradley and Stepanik under Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (current-client conflicts) because joint representation of ten co-defendants created a risk of conflicting duties.
- Discovery was extensive (thousands of phone calls and voluminous materials) and the prosecutor indicated plea offers were expected for one or more defendants.
- At hearings, defendants (Clients) insisted there was no actual conflict: they claimed a unified defense and said they did not intend to plead or testify, but the court and parties agreed future divergence was possible.
- The trial court granted the State’s motion to disqualify; the defendants appealed, arguing denial of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.
- The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion because a substantial risk of conflict existed that could materially limit counsel’s representation of any or all clients.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether disqualification of retained counsel violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice | State: Joint representation of ten clients posed a substantial risk of conflict under Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 given voluminous discovery and anticipated plea offers | Clients: Denial of counsel of choice; no actual conflict exists now—clients unified and do not intend to plead or testify | Court: No abuse of discretion; substantial risk of material limitation justified disqualification |
| Proper standard of review for disqualification | State: Trial court has authority to police conflicts and ensure fair proceedings | Clients: Disqualification is structural error implicating automatic reversal if improper | Held: Abuse-of-discretion review applies; constitutional right to counsel of choice is presumptive and may be overcome by showing serious potential for conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Chambliss, 128 Ohio St.3d 507 (Ohio 2011) (pretrial removal of retained counsel is a final appealable order)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (wrongful denial of counsel of choice is structural error)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (joint representation creates risk of conflicts and may require disqualification)
- Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (court has latitude to balance counsel-of-choice against fairness and potential conflicts)
- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (right to counsel includes right to conflict-free representation)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (possible conflict exists when interests may diverge so as to place counsel under inconsistent duties)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (defines actual conflict as one that adversely affects counsel’s performance)
- Keenan v. State, 81 Ohio St.3d 133 (Ohio 1998) (counsel-of-choice is presumptive and can be overcome by serious potential for conflict)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse-of-discretion standard defined)