State v. Rink
2019 Ohio 4379
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Rink was convicted of rape in 1999, sentenced to 3 years, and allegedly placed on postrelease control when released in 2001. The record later showed postrelease control was not properly imposed in the 1999 case.
- In 2002 Rink was convicted of two additional rape counts; the court sentenced him to 10 years on each count and 5 years for violating postrelease control, ordering the 5-year sanction to be served first and the rape sentences consecutively.
- A 2008 nunc pro tunc entry again imposed the same aggregate sentence; Rink did not appeal that entry.
- From 2014–2019 Rink filed multiple motions arguing the 5-year postrelease-control sanction was void because postrelease control in the 1999 case was invalid; the trial court repeatedly denied relief.
- By the time of the 2019 motion Rink had served the full 5-year postrelease-control sanction and was serving an underlying rape sentence; he sought vacatur of the PRC sanction and crediting the five years to his rape sentence.
- The trial court denied the 2019 motion; on appeal the Sixth District reversed, ordering the court to credit Rink for the five years served because the PRC sanction was void and the time served arose out of the underlying rape convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rink) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rink is entitled to credit toward his underlying rape sentence for five years served on a postrelease-control (PRC) sanction that is void | PRC in 1999 was improperly imposed; the 2002 PRC-violation sentence is therefore void and time served on it should be credited to the rape sentences | Rink waived/forfeited the remedy, and the claim is barred by laches and law-of-the-case | Court: Yes — because PRC was void and the PRC-violation term arose from the underlying convictions, credit is required |
| Whether res judicata or finality bars relief for an improperly imposed PRC | Void PRC portion is reviewable at any time; not barred by res judicata | State argued procedural bars apply | Court: Fischer controls — void PRC may be collaterally attacked anytime; res judicata does not bar review |
| Whether Rink waived or forfeited his challenge by delaying and previously failing to obtain relief | Rink repeatedly raised the void-PRC issue in motions; he did not intentionally relinquish the right | State argued he failed to timely preserve or appeal earlier denials | Court: No waiver/forfeiture — repeated motions show he did not intentionally abandon the claim |
| Whether laches or law-of-the-case prevents relief | Delay does not defeat a collateral attack on a void sentence absent material prejudice; no prior appellate mandate existed | State said undue delay and prior proceedings bar relief | Court: No — state showed no material prejudice from delay; law-of-the-case inapplicable because no earlier appellate mandate governed the 2002 PRC issue |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Fischer, 942 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 2010) (postrelease-control portion of a sentence improperly imposed is void and subject to collateral attack at any time)
- State v. Billiter, 980 N.E.2d 960 (Ohio 2012) (convictions or sanctions based on a void postrelease-control order are likewise void)
- State v. Qualls, 967 N.E.2d 718 (Ohio 2012) (nunc pro tunc entry can correct omitted postrelease-control terms if done before defendant completes the sentence)
- State v. Holdcraft, 1 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2013) (trial court loses jurisdiction to impose postrelease control once defendant finishes the prison term; corrective action must occur before completion)
- State v. Singleton, 920 N.E.2d 958 (Ohio 2009) (remedy for pre–July 11, 2006 sentences with improperly imposed PRC is limited resentencing for proper PRC imposition)
- State v. Payne, 873 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio 2007) (distinguishes waiver from forfeiture in criminal appeals)
- Connin v. Bailey, 472 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1984) (laches requires unreasonable delay plus material prejudice)
- Nolan v. Nolan, 462 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1984) (law-of-the-case is a rule of practice to compel trial courts to follow reviewing-court mandates)
