State v. Richard L. Weber
372 Wis. 2d 202
| Wis. | 2016Background
- Deputy Dorshorst activated emergency lights to effect a traffic stop after observing a defective high‑mounted brake lamp and slight lane weaving; Weber drove ~100 feet into his driveway and an attached (open) garage instead of stopping.
- Dorshorst followed, parked outside the garage with lights on, called dispatch, and both men exited vehicles; Weber moved toward the house door inside the garage.
- Dorshorst shouted at Weber to stop, entered the open garage, seized Weber at the top of the garage stairs, observed signs of intoxication, and eventually arrested him after resistance.
- Search incident to arrest and consent to search produced marijuana, paraphernalia, and later a 0.24 BAC blood result; Weber pleaded no contest to some charges and appealed suppression rulings.
- The court of appeals reversed suppression, ruling exigency not shown; the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals, holding the garage entry and arrest constitutional under the hot‑pursuit exigency in these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Weber) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warrantless entry into garage and arrest were lawful | Entry justified by exigent circumstance of hot pursuit because deputy had probable cause to believe Weber committed jailable offenses (fleeing/resisting) and pursuit was immediate | Entry violated Fourth Amendment; exigent circumstances not established and probable cause for jailable offenses lacking | Reversed court of appeals: entry and arrest were reasonable under hot‑pursuit exigency given probable cause and immediate, limited pursuit |
| Whether deputy had probable cause to arrest before entry | The deputy had probable cause that Weber knowingly resisted a traffic stop (Wis. Stat. §§ 346.04(2t), 946.41(1)) based on lights, failure to stop, and conduct | Weber lacked the requisite knowing resistance; facts (short distance, driveway/garage stop) are consistent with compliance or innocent delay, not a jailable offense | Court held there was probable cause objectively to believe Weber was fleeing and committed jailable offenses before the entry |
| Whether hot pursuit alone can justify home/curtilage entry | Hot pursuit of a suspect who committed jailable offenses can itself be an exigency sufficient to overcome warrant requirement; not limited to additional dangers (e.g., destruction of evidence) | Hot pursuit should not be a standalone exception here; permitting it when the jailable offense is the flight itself creates circular, per se rule and undermines Welsh/McNeely principles | Court: hot pursuit may justify limited warrantless entry when (1) officer has probable cause to believe a jailable offense occurred, (2) pursuit is immediate/continuous, and (3) intrusion is limited and reasonable |
| Scope/reasonableness of intrusion into curtilage/garage | Entry was minimal (stepped into open garage, seized arm, no force, no property damage) and promptly ended—thus reasonable | Physical entry into curtilage/home is presumptively unreasonable; limited intrusion does not excuse lack of exigency or probable cause | Held intrusion was limited to what was necessary to stop flight and thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in these circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (warrantless entry permitted when officers in hot pursuit followed suspect into dwelling)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness and recognized exigent‑circumstances exceptions)
- Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (gravity of underlying offense relevant to exigency analysis)
- Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (warrantless entry permissible in hot pursuit and to prevent destruction of evidence)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (reasonableness as Fourth Amendment touchstone; exigent‑circumstances discussion)
- State v. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524 (Wisconsin precedent recognizing categories of exigent circumstances)
- State v. Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586 (Wis. 2009) (hot pursuit among well‑recognized exigent categories; consider jailable vs. nonjailable offenses)
- State v. Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257 (Wis. 2008) (discussion of hot‑pursuit doctrine and policy reasons for allowing follow‑in)