State v. Reyes
155 A.3d 331
| Del. | 2017Background
- In 2001 Luis E. Reyes was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder and related offenses in the Rockford Park killings; he was sentenced to death and convictions/sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Reyes filed a timely postconviction motion (2004); after protracted proceedings and an evidentiary hearing (2012–2013), the Superior Court (successor judge) vacated his convictions, finding multiple trial errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. The State appealed.
- Key contested factual evidence at trial: inmate Roderick Sterling’s testimony that he overheard Reyes confess; prior testimony Reyes gave in a separate 1997 proceeding (Otero murder) admitted into evidence; physical links tying victims to Reyes/Cabrera; and co‑defendant Luis Cabrera’s statements that pointed to an alternative suspect (Neil Walker).
- Superior Court grounds for vacatur included: (1) Reyes’s waiver of right to testify was not knowing/intelligent (based on allocution); (2) admission of Reyes’s prior testimony was improper; (3) Cabrera’s deferred sentencing made him unavailable and deprived Reyes of exculpatory testimony; (4) Sterling’s testimony was unreliable/hearsay and the State withheld impeachment (Brady) material; and (5) multiple ineffective‑assistance claims tied to these issues.
- Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court in full: reinstated convictions; vacated death sentence remains (per Delaware precedent) and remanded for resentencing to life without parole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reyes) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of right to testify | Reyes said at allocution he avoided testifying in guilt phase to prevent Otero murder coming out, so waiver was not knowing/intelligent | Trial colloquy showed Reyes knowingly and voluntarily waived; allocution explanation does not undermine that adjudication | Waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary; Superior Court erred to the contrary |
| Admissibility of Reyes’s prior (Otero) testimony read into evidence | Prior testimony was hearsay/extrinsic evidence and undermined his decision not to testify | Trial court ruled admissible after defense objections; issue was adjudicated at trial and on direct appeal | Admission was previously adjudicated; Superior Court erred to reopen claim under Rule 61(i)(4) |
| Cabrera unavailability / failure to present Cabrera’s statements | Deferring Cabrera’s sentencing made him unavailable and deprived Reyes of exculpatory testimony (Neil Walker story); counsel ineffective for not offering Cabrera’s pretrial statement | Cabrera’s counsel unequivocally notified defense that Cabrera would assert Fifth if called; Cabrera later invoked Fifth at postconviction hearing; the pretrial statement lacked corroboration for DRE 804(b)(3) admission | No error in sentencing scheduling; Cabrera would have asserted privilege; pretrial statement not admissible/corroborated—no prejudice; Superior Court erred |
| Sterling testimony / hearsay / Brady & counsel performance | Sterling’s testimony was partly hearsay (based on Galindez), was unreliable given benefits received, and State suppressed impeachment material; counsel ineffective for not pursuing hearsay/Brady/missing‑evidence instruction or calling Galindez | Sterling’s trial testimony was limited to what he personally overheard; trial court previously declined deposition; impeachment and benefit were presented to jury; no Brady prejudice shown; counsel’s objections were reasonable | Successor court improperly revisited trial judge’s prior rulings; no Brady prejudice; counsel not ineffective on these points; Superior Court erred |
Key Cases Cited
- Reyes v. State, 819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003) (direct appeal affirming convictions and death sentence)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) (timing and prudence of making and preserving evidentiary objections)
- Davis v. State, 809 A.2d 565 (Del. 2002) (standards for a knowing and voluntary waiver)
- Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 840 (Del. 2013) (standard of review for postconviction relief rulings)
- Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (postconviction/resentencing framework affecting death‑penalty resentencing)