State v. Rettig
416 P.3d 520
| Utah | 2017Background
- In 2009 Rettig and an accomplice forced entry, tied occupants, and the accomplice murdered the homeowner; Rettig pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping as part of a plea deal that dropped other counts and avoided the death penalty.
- Six weeks after pleading guilty, while represented, Rettig sent a pro se letter seeking to withdraw his plea; original counsel withdrew, new counsel later withdrew Rettig’s pro se motion after discussing the facts and law with him.
- Rettig was sentenced to concurrent terms (twenty-five years to life and fifteen years to life) and appealed, seeking to withdraw his plea on grounds including ineffective assistance and insufficiency of the plea affidavit to establish accomplice intent.
- Utah’s Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code §77-13-6, requires a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentence is announced and directs untimely challenges to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA).
- The key legal question was whether the statute’s timing and PCRA-direction (subsection (2)(b) and (2)(c)) bar Rettig’s direct appeal and whether those provisions are constitutional under the Utah Constitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate review is available for plea-voluntariness claims when the defendant failed to move to withdraw before sentencing | Rettig: statute’s timing requirement unconstitutionally infringes Utah Const. art. I §12 (right to appeal) and therefore courts retain direct-review jurisdiction | State: statute is a preservation rule that narrows issues on appeal and prescribes waiver for failure to timely move; it does not foreclose the right to appeal | Court: statute is constitutional; it creates a preservation rule with a jurisdictional waiver sanction—untimely plea challenges on direct appeal are barred and must proceed under the PCRA |
| Whether §77-13-6(2)(c) (requiring untimely plea challenges be pursued via PCRA) exceeds legislative power under Utah Const. art. VIII §4 (court rulemaking power) | Rettig: legislature cannot force challenges into the PCRA in a way that impairs the right to appeal or associated rights (paid counsel/effective assistance) | State: subsection (2)(c) creates a substantive remedial route (pointing to the PCRA) and lies within legislative authority to create remedies | Court: subsection (2)(c) is a permissible exercise of legislative power (it establishes a remedy and is substantive); the provision is constitutional as applied |
| Whether ineffective-assistance or plain-error exceptions permit direct appellate review despite the Plea Withdrawal Statute’s timing rule | Rettig: ineffective assistance and plain error should allow direct review even if motion was untimely | State: the statutory scheme forecloses plain-error/ineffective-assistance review on direct appeal when the statutory deadline is missed | Court: the statute’s comprehensive timing-and-remedy scheme forecloses plain-error and ineffective-assistance exceptions on direct appeal; such claims belong in PCRA proceedings |
| Whether the plea affidavit’s factual admissions suffice to support accomplice intent / voluntariness of plea | Rettig: plea affidavit lacks necessary facts to establish accomplice intent and thus the plea was involuntary | State: merits cannot be reached on direct appeal because statutory preservation/jurisdictional bar applies | Court: did not reach merits — appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under §77-13-6 because Rettig failed to file a pre‑sentence motion to withdraw his plea |
Key Cases Cited
- Gailey v. State, 379 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2016) (held Plea Withdrawal Statute does not facially violate right to appeal and treated statute as a preservation/jurisdictional rule)
- State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 630 (Utah 2002) (interpreted amended plea-withdrawal statute as extinguishing right to challenge plea on direct appeal if statutory deadline missed)
- State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (addressed earlier version of plea-withdrawal statute without time limit and remanded to permit motion to withdraw)
- State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998) (recognized plain-error/exceptional-circumstances review under previous statutory regime)
- State v. Drej, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010) (framework for distinguishing procedural vs. substantive provisions under article VIII, §4)
- State v. Merrill, 114 P.3d 585 (Utah 2005) (referenced as treating the plea-withdrawal provision as jurisdictional)