State v. Ratliff
2D16-5322
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Nov 3, 2017Background
- Kevin Ratliff, a juvenile when he committed first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, was serving two life sentences with parole eligibility and sought postconviction relief under Miller and Graham.
- The trial/postconviction court granted relief, finding the life sentences unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida as interpreted by Atwell v. State.
- The State appealed, arguing the court should have considered Ratliff’s presumptive parole release date (PPRD) to determine whether his life sentences were "de facto" life terms (i.e., effectively life without parole).
- Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Atwell held that Florida’s statutory parole system does not provide the individualized youth-based consideration required by Miller, and that a life-with-parole sentence indistinguishable from life without parole is unconstitutional.
- Florida districts are split: the Fifth District requires a "de facto" life showing based on PPRD; the Third and Fourth Districts read Atwell as requiring relief regardless of PPRD because the parole system’s review is inadequate.
- The Second District (this opinion) affirms the postconviction court, holding Atwell applies regardless of PPRD and certifies conflict with the Fifth District.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juveniles serving life with parole eligibility get Miller/Graham relief only if PPRD makes the sentence a "de facto" life term | Ratliff: Atwell requires relief because Florida’s parole system lacks individualized youth-focused review required by Miller, regardless of PPRD | State: Relief should be limited to cases where PPRD makes the sentence effectively life without parole | Held: Relief is available regardless of PPRD; Atwell turns on parole system inadequacy, not solely on "de facto" life showing |
| Whether Florida’s parole system provides meaningful, youth-focused review satisfying Miller/Graham | Ratliff: Parole statutes prioritize offense seriousness and criminal history, not youth-related mitigating factors | State: Availability of parole (or gain-time/early release mechanisms) can cure constitutional defects | Held: Florida’s parole scheme does not provide the meaningful, individualized review of juvenile characteristics required by Miller/Graham |
| Whether term-of-years sentences must be "de facto" life for Graham to apply | Ratliff: Graham applies without a "de facto" life requirement because review mechanism is lacking | State: Graham should be limited where release mechanisms make sentences non-life | Held: Graham applies to lengthy sentences even if not "de facto" life when review is not meaningful |
| Whether this panel should follow Fifth District precedent requiring "de facto" life showing | Ratliff: Follow Third/Fourth Districts and Atwell’s reasoning | State: Follow Fifth District’s Williams and Stallings | Held: Court adopts Third/Fourth view, declines Fifth District approach, and certifies conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offender unconstitutional)
- Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) (Florida parole system fails to provide Miller-required individualized youth review)
- Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2016) (Graham applies to term-of-years sentences; no requirement that sentence be "de facto" life)
- Johnson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2017) (sentence unconstitutional where early-release mechanisms are insufficient; meaningful, maturity-based, and within natural life criteria)
- Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2015) (post-Miller interpretation encouraging broad application of Miller/Graham principles)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced substantive rule applicable retroactively)