State v. Randle
298 Ga. 375
| Ga. | 2016Background
- Randle, a registered sex offender, seeks removal from OCGA § 42-1-12 registry.
- 2013 petition for release cited OCGA § 42-1-19(a)(4) and six criteria of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1).
- One criterion requires the victim did not suffer any intentional physical harm during the offense.
- Randle pled Alford to child molestation for touching a 10-year-old boy's penis; eight-year sentence, later released.
- Trial court granted removal after hearing; State appealed; Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether 'intentional physical harm' includes any intentional contact or only contact causing injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of intentional physical harm in OCGA 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D). | State contends any intentional contact shows harm. | Randle argues contact alone may not constitute harm. | Harm requires actual injury; contact alone insufficient. |
| Appropriate statutory construction of 'harm' within the broader scheme. | State advocates broad interpretation consistent with other provisions. | Randle supports narrow reading to avoid surplusage and align with related statutes. | Narrow construction; intentional physical harm means injury, not mere contact. |
Key Cases Cited
- Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423 (2013) (de novo standard for legal issue interpretation)
- Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 (2015) (statutory meaning requires natural and reasonable reading)
- Moore v. State, 283 Ga. 151 (2008) (distinguishes physical contact vs. physical harm in battery)
- Hammonds v. State, 263 Ga. App. 5 (2003) (distinguishes contacting insulting/provoking vs. causing injury)
- Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733 (2009) (avoid surplusage; different degrees of related conduct)
- State v. Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1 (2015) (Court of Appeals recognized broader vs narrower readings of harm)