State v. Rafeh
361 Or. 423
Or.2017Background
- In 2012 defendant (Rafeh) refused a voluntary blood draw after a DUII arrest; the arresting deputy completed an Implied Consent Combined Report stating she was given written notice that her license would be suspended unless she requested an administrative hearing.
- Defendant did not request an administrative hearing; DMV suspended her license 30 days after the arrest.
- In 2015 defendant was stopped driving without a license and charged with driving while suspended (DWS).
- At the DWS trial defendant raised an affirmative defense that she had not received notice of the suspension.
- The State introduced the Implied Consent Combined Report; defendant objected under the federal Confrontation Clause to the report’s certification that she had been given a copy. The trial court admitted the certification and the jury convicted.
- The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding the certification was non‑testimonial because its primary purpose was administrative (to enable DMV to proceed with suspension), not to create evidence for prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the certification in the Implied Consent Combined Report is "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause | The certification is admissible because it was created for administrative purposes (to notify DMV and initiate suspension) and thus not testimonial | The certification is testimonial (formal statement made during a criminal investigation and able to be used in later prosecutions), so admission violated the Confrontation Clause | The certification was not testimonial; its primary purpose was administrative (confirming notice for DMV suspension), so Confrontation Clause did not bar admission |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (establishes that testimonial out-of-court statements require confrontation)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (primary-purpose test: statements made to meet ongoing emergency are non‑testimonial)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (objective, fact-based inquiry into primary purpose of interrogation)
- Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015) (statements not made with primary purpose of creating evidence for prosecution are non‑testimonial)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (addresses whether forensic reports are testimonial; focuses on primary purpose and formality)
- State v. Copeland, 353 Or. 816 (2013) (Oregon case holding certificate of service was non‑testimonial because its primary purpose was administrative)