State v. Proctor, 280 P.3d 839

Proctor pled guilty to aggravated indecent solicitation of a child and two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior; victim was a 12-year-old boy and offenses occurred in 2009 when Proctor was 19.
District court imposed a nonprison sentence with probation and treatment, but also ordered lifetime postrelease supervision if he later committed any felony after release from prison.
Under Kansas statutes, lifetime postrelease supervision (and automatic life-without-parole upon a triggering new felony) can be imposed after release; the Parole Board (now the Prison Review Board) administers this regime.
Proctor’s combined sentence would yield a controlling term of 44 months in prison, followed by lifetime postrelease supervision; conviction notice required him to register as a sex offender.
Proctor challenged the lifetime postrelease supervision as applied, arguing it violates state and federal prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.
The Kansas Court of Appeals concluded the challenge was actionable and proceeded to assess constitutionality using Eighth Amendment principles and Kansas § 9.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether lifetime postrelease supervision with automatic life imprisonment upon a new felony violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to Proctor	Proctor contends the scheme is grossly disproportionate to his crime and history.	The state contends the regime is a permissible recidivist and public-safety measure aligned with penalties for serious offenses.	Yes; violated Eighth Amendment.
Ripeness of the challenge given contingent future events	Proctor’s challenge is premised on a hypothetical future felony and thus premature.	The statute’s plain terms and potential future application make the challenge ripe.	Not premature; merits adjudication under current record and governing law.
Whether Kansas § 9 proportionality (state constitutional) supports Proctor’s challenge	Proctor argues proportionality under § 9 should bar an excessively harsh punishment in this context.	State would defer to legislative sentencing structure and comparable standards, arguing no violation.	Proctor succeeds; lifetime postrelease supervision violates § 9 as applied.
How to compare Proctor’s punishment to other offenses and other jurisdictions	Comparative analysis shows gross disproportionality within Kansas and across states.	Variability among offenses and jurisdictions makes universal comparisons indeterminate.	Comparative analysis supports unconstitutionality; scheme is dissimilar to punishments for comparable offenses.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2010) (categorical ban on life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles; informs proportionality framework)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1983) (three-factor proportionality test in noncapital sentences; totality approach)
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1980) (recidivist statute upheld; deference to legislative sentencing authority)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1991) (life imprisonment for cocaine possession upheld; narrow proportionality view discussed)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2003) (plur- or plurality on three-strikes; discusses proportionality and incapacitation purposes)
Van Dyke v. State, 31 Kan. App. 2d 668, 70 P.3d 1217 (Kan. App. 2010) (Kansas appellate proportionality discussion; contextual to noncapital sentences)
State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 235 P.3d 1203 (Kan. 2010) (Kansas proportionality framework under § 9; supports proportionality inquiries)
State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950 (Kan. 1978) (Kansas Freeman factors for disproportionality analysis)
State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1995) (precedent cited regarding constitutional challenges to lengthy sentences)
State v. Cullen, 275 Kan. 56, 60-61, 60 P.3d 933 (Kan. 2003) (treatment of enhanced postrelease provisions in other contexts)