State v. Powell, 256 P.3d 185

Defendant Powell, FedEx courier, faced a large number of missing packages prompting internal FedEx investigators to interview him.
Two FedEx investigators conducted a 30‑minute interview; the first half denied involvement, the second half included promises of leniency by FedEx, suggesting in-house resolution or police involvement.
Defendant then accompanied the investigators to his home to recover stolen property and later gave a written statement at FedEx offices with investigator assistance.
Police later questioned Powell in the same room; a uniformed officer arrived, administered Miranda rights, and Powell gave further inculpatory statements and consent to a home search.
The trial court suppressed the first confession under ORS 136.425(1) due to promises of leniency; it also suppressed the fruits of that confession and the subsequent police confession pending further analysis.
The Court of Appeals held that the first confession was properly suppressed under ORS 136.425(1) but reversed as to the second confession, ejecting the fruits of the first and permitting the second, and remanded for proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ORS 136.425(1) applies to private confessions	Powell argues statute applies only to threats and to public officials.	Powell contends statute extends to private confessions and corroboration applies to private confessions as well.	ORS 136.425(1) applies to private confessions; exclusion applies.
Whether the first FedEx confession was involuntary under ORS 136.425(1)	Federal expectations of leniency induced involuntariness; suppression appropriate.	Promises of leniency were not coercive or coercive enough to render involuntary.	First confession properly suppressed under ORS 136.425(1).
Whether the second confession to police was admissible given the prior confession	Second confession was tainted by prior improper inducement and should be excluded.	Miranda warnings and intervening circumstances dispel any lingering coercive effect.	Second confession admissible; not derived from the first under the statute.
Whether the fruits of the first confession should be suppressed	Fruits derived from an involuntary confession are tainted and should be excluded.	Derivative evidence may remain admissible if independent of coercive conduct.	Physical evidence derived from the first confession suppressed; upheld in part or remanded as to second confession.

State v. Foster, 303 Or. 518 (1987) (expresses voluntariness standards under ORS 136.425(1))
State v. Aguilar, 133 Or. App. 304 (1995) (confessions—coercion and voluntariness principles under ORS 136.425)
State v. Ely, 237 Or. 329 (1964) (private confessions and inducements analyzed under common law)
State v. Wintzingerode, 9 Or. 153 (1881) (successive confessions doctrine; lingering influence of initial inducement)
State v. Green, 128 Or. 49 (1929) (common-law rule against involuntary confessions by non-authorities)
Foster v. State, 303 Or. 518 (1987) (statutory rule complementing common-law involuntary confession doctrine)