125 So. 3d 403
La.2013Background
- Respondent Pierre was convicted of aggravated rape under La.R.S. 14:42 and sentenced to life without parole.
- Post-conviction relief was granted by the district court on a claim centered on newly discovered allegations about a third party, invoking Conway's actual innocence standard.
- The allegations involved Michael Percle and, later, B.B., with C.C. (the victim) recanting or expanding her reported disclosures over time.
- The First Circuit and this Court previously denied direct review; post-conviction proceedings focused on whether the Conway standard and timing rules barred relief.
- The State argued Conway is not cognizable as a stand-alone innocence claim in state post-conviction; and, regardless, the timing provisions under Article 853 barred relief.
- This Court reinstates the conviction and remands for the consideration of remaining post-conviction claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Conway actual-innocence standard applies. | Pierre argues Conway applies; new evidence undermines the State’s case. | The State contends Conway is not cognizable in state post-conviction. | Conway not cognizable; standard not satisfied. |
| Whether the new Percle/B.B. allegations meet gateway actual-innocence. | New evidence undermines credibility and could exonerate; gateway applicable. | No conclusive exoneration; new evidence insufficient for gateway. | Prosecution evidence insufficient for gateway; no relief. |
| Whether the timing of disclosure violated due process and justified a new trial. | Delayed disclosure deprived opportunity for new-trial relief | Time limits under La.C.Cr.P. art. 853 govern; finality unaffected. | Timing not a due-process violation; art. 853 bars relief. |
| Whether the new evidence would have changed the verdict under art. 851(3). | New testimony could have produced different verdict. | Impeachment or credibility gaps not enough for new-trial relief. | New evidence not likely to change verdict under 851 standards. |
| Whether the prosecutor's disclosure duties affect the outcome. | Duty to disclose after-acquired information; could affect fairness. | Disclosures do not overcome finality and standard limits. | Disclosures insufficient to overturn final conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Conway, 816 So.2d 290 (La. 2002) (standard for freestanding post-conviction innocence claims)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1993) (high burden for actual innocence in federal review)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2013) (gateway credible actual-innocence standard for habeas review)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2006) (gateway standard for actual-innocence claims with new evidence)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1995) (new evidence must show no reasonable juror would convict)
- State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La. 1984) (newly discovered evidence standard for new trial)
- State v. Cavalier, 701 So.2d 949 (La. 1997) (newly discovered evidence; credibility impeaches testimony)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1999) (prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1976) (prosecutor's duties and institutional responsibility)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1995) (duty to learn of favorable evidence known to others)