State v. Phillips
299 Kan. 479
| Kan. | 2014Background
- Victim James Dyer was shot and killed after four men (Phillips, Williams, Kettler, Armstrong) went to Rhonda Shaw’s house; multiple witnesses and competing versions (including recanted and inconsistent testimony from Armstrong) were presented at a second joint trial of Phillips with Williams and Kettler.
- First joint trial ended with a deadlocked jury; the court discharged the jury and scheduled a retrial without an explicit on-the-record declaration using the words “I declare/order a mistrial.”
- At the second trial the State called Armstrong (who had given several differing accounts) and other witnesses; Phillips was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
- Phillips appealed raising three main challenges: (1) double jeopardy/mistrial procedure under K.S.A. 22-3423; (2) insufficiency of the evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument (misstatement that premeditation could occur in a “half second”).
- The Kansas Supreme Court considered statutory construction of the mistrial statute, sufficiency review under the standard favoring the State, and prosecutorial-misconduct harmlessness analysis (including Chapman and K.S.A. 60-261 standards).
Issues
| Issue | Phillips' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mistrial / Double jeopardy — whether lack of an explicit on-the-record "order/declare" mistrial violated double jeopardy under K.S.A. 22-3423 | The court never expressly "declared" or "ordered" a mistrial as required by the statute, so retrial violated double jeopardy | The court’s words and actions (discharging a deadlocked jury and retaining the case on the docket) were functionally equivalent to ordering a mistrial; statute does not mandate specific wording | Court rejected Phillips’ claim: no double jeopardy violation — the discharge and scheduling constituted the functional equivalent of a mistrial order. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for premeditated first-degree murder | The shooting was accidental during a struggle; no premeditation or intent to kill by Phillips | Circumstantial and direct evidence (Armstrong’s sworn statement, phone/vehicle evidence, statements, wounds/forensics, conduct before/after) supported intent and premeditation | Court affirmed: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find Phillips guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Prosecutorial misconduct — misstatement that premeditation could occur in a “half second” during closing | The prosecutor misstated the law akin to saying premeditation can be instantaneous, which has been reversible error in prior Kansas cases | The comment was an inartful misstatement but isolated; jury received correct PIK instruction and evidence of premeditation was strong, so any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Court found the prosecutor misstated the law (gross/flagrant) but no ill will; error was harmless and did not require reversal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1982) (double jeopardy protects against multiple prosecutions; retrial allowed when manifest necessity exists)
- Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1984) (hung jury constitutes "manifest necessity" permitting retrial)
- United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (U.S. 1824) (early statement of the doctrine allowing retrial after a jury fails to agree)
- United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2010) (trial court need not employ a rigid verbal formula; words and actions can be functionally equivalent to a mistrial declaration)
- Davidson v. United States, 48 A.3d 194 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (adopting Warren’s functional-equivalence view where bench did not say "mistrial")
- State v. Holmes, 272 Kan. 491 (Kan. 2001) (prosecutorial statements that premeditation can be instantaneous are improper and can be reversible error)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (constitutional error is harmless only if the beneficiary proves beyond a reasonable doubt it did not affect the verdict)