469 P.3d 1023
Utah2020Background
- A nine-year-old child alleged repeated sexual abuse by her stepfather, Robert Peraza; she initially disclosed graphic details, later recanted, then reaffirmed the allegations.
- The State charged Peraza with multiple counts (four sodomy counts; aggravated sexual abuse charge later dismissed) and noticed two potential expert witnesses: the child’s therapist and, later, a forensic interviewer from the Children’s Justice Center (CJC).
- The State filed notice of the CJC forensic interviewer 32 days before trial; Peraza objected orally at a pretrial hearing under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and the Expert Notice Statute (Utah Code § 77-17-13).
- The trial court ruled the witness was qualified under Rule 702(a) but reserved ruling on the substantive reliability of her testimony under Rule 702(b); it ordered the State to pare down and provide the articles and to make the expert available for consultation.
- Defense counsel later requested a continuance to obtain a defense expert after learning therapy techniques that might have ‘‘contaminated’’ the child’s testimony; the court denied the continuance.
- At trial the forensic interviewer testified as a rebuttal expert, defense lodged limited objections and did not object under Rule 702(b); the jury convicted Peraza. The Utah Court of Appeals vacated the convictions, but the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Peraza) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court of appeals erred by conflating Utah Rule of Evidence 702 (expert admissibility) with the Expert Notice Statute and vacating admission of the State’s expert. | The court of appeals wrongly mixed distinct notice rules and admissibility standards; Rule 702 governs admissibility and the record showed a sufficient 702 foundation at trial. | The trial court effectively admitted the expert at the pretrial stage based only on the State’s notice, which was insufficient under the Statute and 702, so admission was an abuse of discretion. | Reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held the appeals court conflated the Statute with Rule 702; the trial record (preliminary questioning at trial) established the Rule 702 threshold and the testimony was admissible. |
| Whether the court of appeals correctly shifted the burden to the State to disprove prejudice after the trial court denied a continuance. | The State argued the court of appeals erred in shifting the burden; Peraza did not move for a continuance under the Expert Notice Statute and thus the burden to show prejudice rests with the defendant. | Peraza contended the continuance request arose from the State’s failure to comply with the Expert Notice Statute, invoking precedent that shifts the burden to the State. | Reversed the court of appeals’ burden-shift. The Supreme Court held Peraza waived reliance on the Statute and had requested the continuance to secure his own expert; therefore the defendant bears the burden to show prejudice. The case was remanded for the court of appeals to apply the correct prejudice standard and address remaining claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) (burden-shift to State where prosecution wrongfully fails to disclose inculpatory evidence)
- State v. Lowther, 398 P.3d 1032 (Utah 2017) (abuse-of-discretion standard for admission/exclusion of expert testimony)
- State v. Cuttler, 367 P.3d 981 (Utah 2015) (review limits for evidentiary rulings)
- Mackin v. State, 387 P.3d 986 (Utah 2016) (continuance denial reviewed for abuse of discretion; defendant must show prejudice)
- State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (Court of Appeals treating Expert Notice Statute violations as prompting burden-shift to State)