State v. Pelella, 170 A.3d 647

Background

Defendant Michael Pelella told his brother Francis during a domestic dispute, “if you go into the attic I will hurt you.” Mother called police; police report and a cell‑phone video were in the record.
Francis said he felt threatened and feared the defendant because of past physical harm by the defendant; defendant and mother claimed the remark was made to the mother, not directly to Francis.
Defendant was charged with two counts of threatening in the second degree under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑62 (a) (intent to terrorize; reckless disregard).
Defendant moved to dismiss pretrial for insufficiency of evidence, arguing the utterance was a spontaneous, non‑threatening outburst and not a constitutionally unprotected “true threat.”
Trial court granted the motion, concluding the state could not show the statement was a true threat; the state appealed.
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding imminence is not a required element of a true threat and that the motion to dismiss must be evaluated viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state; a jury could reasonably find a true threat.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Pelella)	Held
Whether a true‑threat must be imminent to be punishable	Imminence is not required; Krijger’s language suggesting imminence is dictum and inconsistent with prior precedent.	Trial court correctly relied on Krijger’s language that a prosecutable threat must be immediate or imminent.	Imminence (immediacy) is only one factor; it is not a requirement.
Proper standard for determining a true threat	Use objective standard from Krijger/DeLoreto: would a reasonable listener, familiar with context, highly likely interpret the statement as a serious intent to harm?	Statement was a spontaneous angry outburst and susceptible to non‑threatening interpretations.	Krijger’s objective/contextual standard applies; prosecution must show a reasonable listener would be highly likely to view the speech as a genuine threat.
Standard of review on pretrial motion to dismiss for insufficiency	Court must view proffered evidence and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the state; less than trial standard applies.	Trial court can dismiss if ambiguous interpretations exist; it treated facts as favoring defendant.	Court must view evidence in light most favorable to the state; if evidence would permit a person of reasonable caution to believe the crime occurred, deny dismissal.
Whether, on the record, the statement was a true threat as a matter of law	The statement was an unambiguous ultimatum, made (as claimed by Francis) directly to him, in context of prior physical harm and mother’s call to police — a jury could find a true threat.	Facts show ambiguity (may have been said to mother, not aimed at Francis) and lack of imminence or specific plan, so protected speech.	Fact issue: close case but jury must decide; reversal of dismissal and remand to deny motion to dismiss.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Krijger, 313 Conn. 434 (Conn. 2014) (articulates objective, context‑sensitive test for true threats)
State v. DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145 (Conn. 2003) (holds imminence is not required for true threats)
State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237 (Conn. 2008) (true threats need not be immediate; conditional threats can be unprotected)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (explains true threats are unprotected because they communicate serious intent to commit violence)
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizes conditional threats are still threats; language on imminence not strictly required)