State v. Peeler, 320 Conn. 567

Russell Peeler was convicted after a jury trial for attempted murder, risk of injury to children, and murder; this court reversed in Peeler I because the trial court improperly disqualified his chosen counsel, Gary Mastronardi, and ordered a new trial.
Mastronardi had been privately retained and disqualified because the prosecution intended to call him as a witness in a separate capital case; the trial court appointed Robert Sullivan as assigned counsel for the first trial.
On remand the trial court held a status conference: Peeler had become indigent, Mastronardi refunded trial fees and refused to accept the lower assigned‑counsel rates, and the Division of Public Defender Services would not pay Mastronardi’s private rates.
Peeler moved to require the state to pay Mastronardi’s private fee (or alternatively dismiss), arguing remand meant he must get the same counsel of choice at retrial; the trial court denied the motion and proceeded with assigned counsel Sullivan.
Peeler was retried, convicted on all counts, and appealed, arguing the trial court failed to effectuate the Peeler I remedy by refusing to fund Mastronardi at retrial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Peeler)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether an indigent defendant is entitled to have the state pay his privately retained counsel’s fee so that the same attorney (previously disqualified) can represent him at a new trial ordered to remedy a counsel‑of‑choice violation	Peeler: Remand for a new trial under Peeler I/Gonzalez‑Lopez requires restoration of his chosen counsel; denying state payment would render the remedy meaningless and justify dismissal if necessary	State: The proper remedy is a new trial; who represents the defendant at retrial depends on circumstances then (including indigency and counsel’s willingness to accept appointed rates); no constitutional right to force state to pay private fees	Held: Trial court must inquire whether the previously disqualified attorney is willing and able to represent at retrial under mutually acceptable terms. If counsel will not or cannot do so (including rejecting assigned rates), the defendant’s sole constitutional relief is the new trial and appointment/hire of other counsel; no entitlement to state payment of private counsel’s fee.

United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice is structural error requiring reversal)
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (no right to use public funds to pay privately retained counsel)
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (right to counsel of choice limited where defendant requires appointed counsel or counsel declines)
United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (on remand trial court must inquire whether disqualified counsel would have been willing and able to resume representation at terms defendant could meet; if not, retrial with new counsel is proper)
State v. Peeler, 265 Conn. 460 (2003) (Peeler I) (trial court’s disqualification of Mastronardi was improper; reversal and remand for new trial ordered)