State v. Passwater
2015 MT 159
| Mont. | 2015Background
- On July 11, 2012, Brent Passwater, while intoxicated, failed to yield on a left turn and struck a motorcycle carrying Bryce and Lynn Boots; Bryce sustained a broken foot and Lynn required a below-knee amputation.
- Passwater pleaded guilty to Negligent Vehicular Assault on October 18, 2013; sentencing was set for March 19, 2014.
- The State filed a Presentence Investigation (PSI) including a Life Care Plan prepared by a certified life‑care planner estimating Lynn’s future care costs at $1,278,256. The Boots’ affidavit claimed total pecuniary loss of $1,427,318.01.
- Passwater filed an objection to the PSI, calling the Plan speculative, disputing Crowley’s qualifications, and proposing a much lower restitution figure; at sentencing he presented a single amputee witness and lowered his proposed restitution.
- The district court reviewed the Plan line‑by‑line, reduced some line items as speculative, and ordered restitution of $593,828.01 to the Boots and $24,988.40 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program (total $618,816.41).
- Passwater appealed, arguing (1) the Plan’s cost projections were too speculative to support restitution and (2) admission of the Plan violated his due‑process rights because it contained inadmissible hearsay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court erred in awarding restitution based in part on the Life Care Plan | The State: the Plan was a reasonable, well‑supported measure of pecuniary loss (expert preparation, citations, and consultation with medical providers) and provided the best evidence available | Passwater: the Plan’s cost projections were speculative, contained multiple "maybes," and relied on hearsay; thus insufficient foundation for restitution | The court affirmed. The Plan constituted substantial evidence; the court appropriately reduced speculative items and used its judgment to calculate restitution |
| Whether use of the Plan at sentencing violated Passwater’s due process/right to confront because it contained hearsay | The State: rules of evidence (including hearsay) do not apply at sentencing; the defendant had opportunity to rebut | Passwater: reliance on uncross‑examined hearsay deprived him of due process | The court held no violation: evidentiary rules largely inapplicable at sentencing and the defendant had adequate opportunity and time to rebut but failed to do so |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Aragon, 321 P.3d 841 (Mont. 2014) (standard of review for restitution and requirement that award rest on substantial evidence)
- State v. Collucio, 214 P.3d 1282 (Mont. 2009) (reversal where restitution rested on speculative testimony and unsupported assumptions)
- State v. O’Connor, 212 P.3d 276 (Mont. 2009) (restitution may be based on reasonable methods and best evidence available despite some uncertainty)
- State v. Bingman, 745 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1987) (hearsay may be considered at sentencing)
- State v. Dunkerson, 76 P.3d 1085 (Mont. 2003) (same; sentencing proceedings are not bound by evidentiary rules)
