State v. Pass, 832 N.W.2d 836

Background

Pass was tried for two counts of second-degree murder (Tina San Roman) and assault/attempted murder (victim O.A.R.). The jury acquitted Pass of the San Roman charges and deadlocked on the counts related to O.A.R.
At the first trial, O.A.R. testified that he found San Roman on the garage floor with Pass standing over her; Pass then stabbed O.A.R. during an attempt to help San Roman. Forensic evidence linked blood at the scene to Pass, O.A.R., and San Roman.
Before a retrial on the unresolved counts, the State sought to admit evidence about San Roman’s death to show motive; the district court initially excluded that evidence under Wakefield and denied dismissal of the remaining counts.
On remand the State narrowed its proffer; Pass sought to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence (unredacted prior statements and DNA) implicating someone else in San Roman’s death. The district court excluded all evidence related to San Roman’s death under a Rule 403-type analysis and then dismissed the remaining counts, holding exclusion would violate Pass’s due process right to present a complete defense.
The court of appeals affirmed; the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and addressed (1) whether the State could appeal dismissal without violating double jeopardy and (2) whether excluding Pass’s alternative-perpetrator evidence violated due process.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May the State appeal the district court’s dismissal without violating double jeopardy?	State: Dismissal was based on due process ruling unrelated to factual guilt, so appeal is permitted.	Pass: Dismissal effectively acquits and prevents appeal under double jeopardy protections.	Court: Appeal allowed — dismissal rested on legal due process grounds, not a factual acquittal, so no double jeopardy bar.
Did exclusion of Pass’s alternative-perpetrator evidence violate his due process right to present a complete defense?	Pass: Excluding evidence that points to another perpetrator eviscerates his ability to present a complete defense.	State: Evidentiary rules (Rule 403 and foundational requirements) permit exclusion of confusing, unfairly prejudicial, or unconnected alternative-perpetrator evidence.	Court: No due process violation — application of Rule 403 (and related evidentiary limits) was not arbitrary or disproportionate under Holmes; exclusion constitutional.
Was the district court’s reasoning adequate under Holmes when excluding defense evidence?	Pass: District court’s exclusion deprived him without proper Holmes analysis.	State: The court’s Rule 403 concerns are legitimate; Holmes permits such exclusions if proportionate.	Court: District court and court of appeals failed to explicitly apply Holmes’ additional balancing, but Holmes itself supports exclusion; result affirmed (dismissal reversed).
Must district court clarify scope of its exclusion order on remand?	State: Needs clarity to proceed fairly.	Pass: Ambiguity may harm defense planning.	Court: Yes — remand for clarification and further proceedings consistent with opinion.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979) (limits admissibility of evidence regarding acquitted offenses)
State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 2000) (double jeopardy and State appealability after acquittal)
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (distinguishing acquittals on merits from dismissals for nonfactual reasons)
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (constitutional test for excluding defense evidence implicating another perpetrator)
State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. 2010) (Minnesota acceptance of foundational limits on alternative-perpetrator evidence)
State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004) (foundational requirement connecting alternative perpetrator to the offense)
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of evidentiary rules excluding certain defense evidence)