531 P.3d 711
Or. Ct. App.2023Background
- Defendant Rudy Nino Parras, a convicted felon whose prior convictions were for manufacture and possession of methamphetamine, was charged under ORS 166.270 (felon in possession of a firearm).
- At trial defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing ORS 166.270 was unconstitutional as applied because his predicate felonies were nonviolent.
- While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bruen, replacing the post‑Heller two‑step test with a history‑centered inquiry: a firearm regulation is constitutional only if consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- The Court of Appeals applied Bruen’s historical test to ORS 166.270 and surveyed historical sources and precedent addressing dispossession of arms for persons deemed not “law‑abiding” or “virtuous.”
- The court concluded historical tradition supports disarming persons who commit serious crimes and that historical sources do not draw a clear violent/nonviolent felony distinction for disarmament.
- The court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and upheld application of ORS 166.270 to Parras.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 166.270 (felon in possession) is consistent with the Second Amendment under Bruen's history‑centered test | State: ORS 166.270 is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition disarming those who are not law‑abiding | Parras: Second Amendment covers his possession and historical tradition does not support dispossessing nonviolent felons | Held: Statute is consistent with historical tradition; constitutional as applied |
| Whether the Second Amendment protection extends to a felon whose prior offenses were nonviolent | State: Historical tradition removes Second Amendment protection from felons generally, not just violent felons | Parras: Only violent felons should be disarmed; his nonviolent drug felonies do not justify dispossession | Held: Court rejects violent/nonviolent distinction; history does not support limiting dispossession to violent offenders |
| Whether Bruen displaced earlier Heller/McDonald‑era analyses for this challenge | State: Bruen requires a history‑based inquiry; that inquiry supports ORS 166.270 | Parras: Even under Bruen, the statute cannot be applied to him because history does not support dispossession for nonviolent felons | Held: Bruen governs; historical evidence supports dispossession for those who violate social compact |
| Whether defendant preserved a facial challenge to ORS 166.270 | State: Defendant expressly declined to press a facial challenge at trial; not preserved | Parras: (sought to raise facial challenge after Bruen) | Held: Facial challenge was unpreserved and not considered; only as‑applied claim resolved |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (adopts history‑centered test: firearm regulations are constitutional only if consistent with nation’s historical tradition)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense but identifies longstanding prohibitions—e.g., felons—in as presumptively lawful)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment against the states and reiterates that Heller did not cast doubt on longstanding regulatory measures)
- State v. Shelnutt, 309 Or. App. 474 (2021) (rejected as‑applied challenge to ORS 166.270; defendant’s nonviolent drug conviction did not show statute unconstitutional as applied)
- State v. Beeman, 290 Or. App. 429 (2018) (rejected facial challenge to ORS 166.270 and applied intermediate scrutiny pre‑Bruen)
- State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or. 622 (2005) (Oregon Supreme Court historical analysis concluding framers viewed criminals as outside Second Amendment protections)