State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914

Defendant Fedor Pakhnyuk (38) stayed at his brother’s home; he gave alcohol to and made sexual advances toward teenage girls, then later was observed on the roof peering into a niece’s bedroom window. He was charged with interference with privacy (Minn. Stat. § 609.746), furnishing alcohol to a minor, and disorderly conduct; jury convicted on all counts.
The interference-with-privacy charge was under § 609.746, subd. 1(a): (1) enter another’s property; (2) surreptitiously gaze, stare, or peep into a dwelling; and (3) do so with intent to intrude upon or interfere with privacy.
On appeal Pakhnyuk argued for the first time that the intent element applies to the entry (clause (1)) as well as to the peeping (clause (2)); he contended the State failed to prove intent at entry and thus evidence was insufficient.
The State argued Pakhnyuk forfeited that statutory-interpretation sufficiency claim by not raising it below and alternatively argued the intent element applies only to peeping.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held Pakhnyuk did not forfeit the statutory-interpretation sufficiency challenge and that the specific-intent requirement applies only to peeping; the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Forfeiture: whether a statutory-interpretation sufficiency challenge is forfeited if not raised in district court	State: Pakhnyuk forfeited the argument by not raising it below	Pakhnyuk: may raise on appeal because sufficiency challenges concern whether guilt was proven at all	Court: No forfeiture; due-process and the nature of sufficiency review permit appellate consideration of statutory-interpretation sufficiency claims raised first on appeal
Scope of intent in § 609.746(1)(a): whether the intent to intrude must exist at entry as well as at peeping	Pakhnyuk: intent clause (3) unambiguously modifies both entry and peeping; State failed to prove intent at entry	State: clause (3) applies only to the peeping act (clause (2)); intent need not exist at entry	Court: statute ambiguous; legislative history, purpose, and related provisions indicate the intent element applies only to the peeping conduct (clause (2)); conviction affirmed

State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 2006) (discusses general forfeiture rule and exceptions)
State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 2015) (State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense)
State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2018) (statutory-interpretation review de novo for sufficiency claims)
State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015) (statutory interpretation aims to effectuate legislative intent)
In re Estate of Butler, 803 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2011) (last-antecedent rule and consideration of punctuation/structure in statutory construction)