State v. Paden, 533 S.W.3d 731

Background

Paden pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy for offenses when the victim was under 12; plea accepted August 17, 2015; judgment entered November 2, 2015.
At plea and sentencing, prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court all believed statutory law required the two 30-year sentences to run consecutively, producing an effective range of 20–60 years.
Paden later moved under Rule 29.07(d) to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging he entered the plea under a misapprehension about the sentencing range (that consecutive sentences were mandatory) and that he would not have pled otherwise.
The parties jointly filed a Rule 29.12(b) motion asking the court to remand for resentencing because the consecutive-sentence conclusion was mistaken; the court granted the joint motion and set a resentencing date.
The motion court denied Paden’s Rule 29.07(d) motion; Paden appealed that denial. The appellate court held the court’s grant of the Rule 29.12(b) joint motion was void because the sentencing judgment had been final and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter it.
The appellate court also held Paden had used the wrong procedural vehicle: post-sentencing claims that a plea was unknowing/invalid must generally be raised under Rule 24.035, not Rule 29.07(d). The denial of the Rule 29.07(d) motion was affirmed and the void remand order was vacated.

Issues

Issue	Paden's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to grant the parties’ joint Rule 29.12(b) motion to remand after sentence was final?	Trial court could recall Paden for resentencing and consider his post‑sentence Rule 29.07 motion; remand authorized.	Once sentence is final the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify sentence except as authorized by statute or rule; the Rule 29.12(b) grant was void.	Trial court lacked authority; the joint Rule 29.12(b) order was void and must be vacated.
Was Paden’s post‑sentencing Rule 29.07(d) motion a proper vehicle to attack the voluntariness/knowingness of his plea?	Ralston permits a Rule 29.07 motion after remand; Paden contends he was effectively remanded and thus needed only preponderance proof of mistake.	Because sentence was final and not vacated, Rule 24.035 is the exclusive post‑conviction remedy for claims that a plea was unknowing/invalid.	Rule 29.07(d) was the wrong vehicle post‑sentence; such claims must ordinarily be raised under Rule 24.035.
On the merits, did the record show manifest injustice or prejudice warranting withdrawal of the plea under Rule 29.07(d)?	Paden argued he pled under a material misapprehension about the sentencing range and would not have pled otherwise.	The court reviewed the record and procedural posture and found Paden did not meet the proper standard under Rule 29.07(d) post‑sentence.	The motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief; Paden’s point on appeal denied.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Joordens, 347 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. App.) (trial court loses jurisdiction after sentence is entered)
State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc) (trial court cannot act after final sentence except as authorized)
State v. Ralston, 39 S.W.3d 546 (Mo. App.) (Rule 29.07 motion may be considered where sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing)
State v. Onate, 398 S.W.3d 102 (Mo. App.) (post‑sentence Rule 29.07(d) has limited role; claims that plea was unknowingly entered fall under Rule 24.035)
State v. Sexton, 75 S.W.3d 304 (Mo. App.) (Rule 24.035 is the exclusive procedure for post‑incarceration relief for claims attacking plea or sentence)
McCoy v. State, 456 S.W.3d 887 (Mo. App.) (standard of review: denial of motion to withdraw plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion)