State v. JOORDENSState v. JOORDENS
Aaron R. Joordens appeals from the circuit court’s order that vacated an amended judgment, which had ordered that his sentences run concurrently, and reinstated the terms of the court’s original judgment, which had ordered that his sentences run consecutively. He claims that the circuit court had the authority to enter the amended judgment and misapplied the law in vacating it. We find that, because the circuit court purported to enter the amended judgment and the order vacating the amended judgment after it had lost jurisdiction to do so, those orders were invalid. Pursuant to our supervisory authority to confine a circuit court to its jurisdiction, we remand the case to the circuit court to vacate all orders entered after the final judgment.
On January 6, 2010, Joordens pled guilty to Counts V and VI. The State voluntarily dismissed Count IV, and the parties proceeded to a bench trial on Count III. The circuit court acquitted Joordens of the charge in Count III. Thereafter, the circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing on the counts to which Joordens had previously pled guilty. The court sentenced Joordens to consecutive sentences of seven years on Count I, seven years on Count II, six years on Count V, and six years on Count VI.
On January 12, 2010, Joordens filed a motion to reconsider, requesting that the circuit court “on its own motion” grant him probation pursuant to section 559.115, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010. 1 On March 4, 2010, the court set aside the January 6, 2010, judgment and sentences and resen-tenced Joordens to the same prison terms but ordered that his sentences run concurrently instead of consecutively. This reduced the time that Joordens was to be incarcerated from twenty-six years to seven years.
On March 23, 2010, the circuit court vacated the amended judgment of March 4, 2010, and reinstated the January 6, 2010, judgment, which ordered that Joor-dens’s sentences run consecutively. Joor-dens appeals. In his sole point on appeal, Joordens claims that the circuit court did not exceed its authority in entering the amended judgment and that the court misapplied the law when it vacated the amended judgment and reinstated the January 6, 2010, judgment.
A final judgment in a criminal case occurs “when a
sentence
is entered.”
State v.
Williams,
When a judgment becomes final, the circuit court’s ability to act is halted and the appellate court’s ability to review commences.
City of Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.,
Joordens argues that, because the State failed to challenge the circuit court’s authority in the proceeding to amend the judgment and resentence him, any claim of error was waived. 5 We disagree. The State’s acquiescence in the circuit court’s actions beyond its jurisdiction cannot endow those actions with a legitimacy that they never enjoyed. The amended judgment and the order vacating the amended judgment and reinstating the January 6, 2010, judgment were invalid. Id. at 77.
The State asks us to dismiss Joor-dens’s appeal on the basis that, because Joordens is appealing from an order that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. If that were the case, then an appellate court would not be able to determine whether a judgment was invalid because it was entered when the circuit court did not have jurisdiction. Id. The effect of this “would be to leave the invalid judgment intact.” Id. Hence, while appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal unless the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine the issues presented on their merits, “[ajppellate courts inherently have supervisory authority to confine a trial court to its jurisdiction.” Id.
Pursuant to our supervisory authority to confine the circuit court to its jurisdiction, we find that the January 6, 2010, judgment and sentence was the final judgment in this case and that all orders entered after that time were invalid. We, therefore, remand the case to the circuit court to vacate all orders entered after the January
All concur.
Notes
. Commonly referred to as a "120-day call back,” this allows the circuit court to utilize a period of shock incarceration prior to probation.
. Rule 29.13 gives the circuit court the authority to set aside a final judgment under certain circumstances. That rule says:
(a) Within thirty days after the entry of judgment and prior to the filing of the transcript of the record in the appellate court, the court may of its own initiative or on motion of a defendant arrest or set aside a judgment upon either of the following grounds: (1) that the facts stated in the indictment or information do not constitutean offense; or (2) that the court is without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The court shall specify of record the grounds upon which the order is entered.
(b) The court may, with the consent of the defendant, order a new trial of its own initiative before the entry of judgment and imposition of sentence but not later than thirty days after the verdict of the jury is returned.
Rule 29.13. The circuit court did not set aside the January 6, 2010, judgment pursuant to Rule 29.13.
.Although not applicable in this case, the circuit court may enter a valid
nunc pro tunc
order after a judgment becomes final. Rule 29.12;
State ex ret. Poucher v. Vincent,
. The actions of the circuit court are completely understandable. After the circuit court entered its amended judgment on March 4, 2010, it became aware of this court's holding in
State ex rel. Scroggins v. Kellogg,
. To further exacerbate the proceedings, the State had appealed the court's "amended” judgment but dismissed the appeal in reliance on the circuit court’s action reinstating the original final judgment.
. We, thus, through our mandate, endow the circuit court with the authority to correct its error of March 4, 2010, the same action it attempted on March 23, 2010, but was then without jurisdiction to execute.