State v. Pacquing., 139 Haw. 302

On March 23 and April 7, 2008, Chester Pacquing was stopped driving using another man’s name and personal data and later admitted using that information to avoid arrest; he was charged under Hawai‘i’s Unauthorized Possession of Confidential Personal Information (UPCPI) statute, HRS § 708-839.55, which references the definitional section HRS § 708-800.
The complaint alleged Pacquing “possess[ed], without authorization, any confidential personal information of [the complainant] in any form” but did not recite HRS § 708-800’s statutory definition.
Pacquing moved to dismiss on multiple grounds (insufficiency, de minimis, vagueness, overbreadth); the circuit court dismissed the complaint as legally insufficient and also held the UPCPI statutes overbroad; the State appealed and Pacquing cross-appealed.
The State conceded at oral argument the complaint was defective for failing to include the statutory definition of “confidential personal information.”
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court (Pollack, J.) affirmed dismissal of the complaint without prejudice for lack of sufficient notice, held the UPCPI statutes not facially overbroad, but found portions of HRS § 708-800 unconstitutionally vague and severed the vague language.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Pacquing)	Held
Sufficiency of the charge / fair notice	Complaint language was readily comprehensible; omission of statutory definition was harmless.	Complaint failed to inform defendant what "confidential personal information" meant; violated state and federal notice rights.	Complaint legally insufficient; State conceded omission; dismissal affirmed without prejudice.
Overbreadth (First Amendment)	UPCPI is narrowly focused on identity-theft–related data and does not reach protected press/speech; any chilling effect is minimal.	Statute could criminalize possession/publication of lawfully obtained information by press, chilling speech; facial challenge warranted.	Statute is not facially overbroad: interpret "without authorization" to exclude constitutionally protected press possession/publication.
Vagueness (Due Process)	Definition is workable; enforcement can rely on context and statutory examples.	"Significant privacy interest" and open-ended clauses (passwords, "other" codes) are subjective and fail to give fair warning; statute encourages arbitrary enforcement.	HRS § 708-800 is unconstitutionally vague in part: open-ended phrases invite subjective application and must be excised; enumerated items (SSN, driver’s license, account numbers) remain.

Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (state may not criminally punish publication of truthful information about public proceedings)
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (states generally may not punish publication of lawfully obtained truthful information)
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (statute penalizing publication of lawfully obtained victim’s name struck down as insufficiently tailored)
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (speech-informing public interest can shield a publisher who received unlawfully intercepted but truthful information)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (statutory scope must be understood before overbreadth analysis)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vague statutes that confer unfettered discretion to enforcers are unconstitutional)
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (preference to preserve statute by severing unconstitutional provisions when feasible)
State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i 383 (2009) (charging instrument sufficient when it sets forth essential elements and is readily comprehensible)