SMITH, JUDGE, ET AL. v. DAILY MAIL PUBLISHING CO. ET AL.
No. 78-482
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 20, 1979—Decided June 26, 1979
443 U.S. 97
Cletus B. Hanley, Special Assistant Attorney General of West Virginia, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General, and Betty L. Caplan, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Floyd Abrams argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dean Ringel, F. Paul Chambers, Michael A. Albert, and Rudolph L. Di Trapano.*
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a West Virginia statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.
(1)
The challenged West Virginia statute provides:
“[N]or shall the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published in any newspaper without a written order of the court. . . .”
W. Va. Code § 49-7-3 (1976) ;
and:
“A person who violates . . . a provision of this chapter for which punishment has not been specifically provided,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor more than six months, or both such fine and imprisonment.” § 49-7-20 .
On February 9, 1978, a 15-year-old student was shot and killed at Hayes Junior High School in St. Albans, W. Va., a small community located about 13 miles outside оf Charleston, W. Va. The alleged assailant, a 14-year-old classmate, was identified by seven different eyewitnesses and was arrested by police soon after the incident.
The Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Gazette, respondents here, learned of the shooting by monitoring routinely the police band radio frequency; they immediately dispatched reporters and photographers to the junior high school. The reporters for both papers obtained the nаme of the alleged assailant simply by asking various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the school.
The staffs of both newspapers prepared articles for publication about the incident. The Daily Mail‘s first article appeared in its February 9 afternoon edition. The article did not mention the alleged attacker‘s name. The editorial decision to omit the name was made because of the statutory prohibition against publication without prior court approval.
The Gazette made a contrary editorial decision and published the juvenile‘s name and picture in an article about the shooting that appeared in the February 10 morning edition of the paper. In addition, the name of the alleged juvenile attacker was broadcast over at least three different radio stations on February 9 and 10. Since the information had be-
On March 1, an indictment against the respondents was returned by a grand jury. The indictment alleged that each knowingly published the name of a youth involved in a juvenile proceeding in violation of
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued the writ of prohibition. — W. Va. —, 248 S. E. 2d 269 (1978). Relying on holdings of this Court, it held that the statute abridged the freedom of the press. The court reasoned that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and that the State‘s interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such prior restraints.
We granted certiorari. 439 U. S. 963 (1978).
(2)
Respondents urge this Court to hold that because
Pеtitioners do not dispute that the statute amounts to a prior restraint on speech. Rather, they take the view that even if it is a prior restraint the statute is constitutional because of the significance of the State‘s interest in protecting the identity of juveniles.
(3)
The resolution of this case does not turn on whether the statutory grant of authority to the juvenile judge to permit publication of the juvenile‘s name is, in and of itself, a prior restraint. First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior restraints, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), and respondents acknowledge that the statutory provision for court approval of disclosure actually may have a less oppressive effect on freedom of the press than a total ban on the publication of the child‘s name.
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful in-
Our recent decisions demonstrate that state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards. In Landmark Communications we declared unconstitutional a Virginia statute making it a crime to publish information regarding confidential proceedings before a state judicial review commission that heard complaints about alleged disabilities and misconduct of state-court judgеs. In declaring that statute unconstitutional, we concluded:
“[T]he publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth‘s interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom.” 435 U. S., at 838.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, we held that damages could not be recovered against a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim. The suit had been based on a state statute that made it a crime to publish the name of the victim; the purpose of the statute was
“By placing the information in the public domain on official court rеcords, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served. . . . States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection.” 420 U. S., at 495.
One case that involved a classic prior restraint is particularly relevant to our inquiry. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308 (1977), we struck down a state-court injunction prohibiting the news media from publishing the name or photograph of аn 11-year-old boy who was being tried before a juvenile court. The juvenile court judge had permitted reporters and other members of the public to attend a hearing in the case, notwithstanding a state statute closing such trials to the public. The court then attempted to halt publication of the information obtained from that hearing. We held that once the truthful information was “publicly revealed” or “in the public domain” the court could not constitutionally restrain its dissemination.
Nоne of these opinions directly controls this case; however, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. These cases involved situations where the government itself provided or made possible press access to the information. That factor is not contrоlling. Here respondents relied upon routine newspaper reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged assailant.
(4)
The sole interest advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile offender. It is asserted that confidentiality will further his rehabilitation because publication of the name may encourage further antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose future employment or suffer other consequences for this single offense. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), similar arguments were advanced by the State to justify not permitting a criminal defendant to impeach a prosecution witness on the bаsis of his juvenile record. We said there that “[w]e do not and need not challenge the State‘s interest as a matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender.” Id., at 319. However, we concluded that the State‘s policy must be subordinated to the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Ibid. The important rights created by the First Amendment must be considered along with the rights of defendants guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 561. Therefore, the reasoning of Davis that thе constitutional right must prevail over the state‘s interest in protecting juveniles applies with equal force here.
The magnitude of the State‘s interest in this statute is not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty to respondents. Moreover, the statute‘s approach does not satisfy constitutional requirements. The statute does not restrict
In addition, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the imposition of criminal penalties is necessary to protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. As the Brief for Resрondents points out at 29 n. **, all 50 states have statutes that provide in some way for confidentiality, but only 5, including West Virginia,2 impose criminal penalties on nonparties for publication of the identity of the juvenile. Although every state has asserted a similar interest, all but a handful have found other ways of accomplishing the objective. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S., at 843.3
(5)
Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue before us of unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., at 496 n. 26; there is no issue here of privacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity. At issue is simply the power of a state
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this сase.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment.
Historically, we have viewed freedom of speech and of the press as indispensable to a free society and its government. But recognition of this proposition has not meant that the public interest in free speech and press always has prevailed over competing interests of the public. “Freedom of speech thus does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time,” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394 (1950), and “the press is not free to publish with impunity everything and anything it desires to publish.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 683 (1972); see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 708, 716 (1931). While we have shown a special solicitude for freedom of speech and of the press, we have eschewed absolutes in favor of a more delicate calculus that carefully weighs the conflicting interests to determine which demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. E. g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 838, 843 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 562 (1976); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 400.
It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside of the public‘s full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. See H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United Statеs 131-133 (1927); Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 101, 102, 116 (1958). This insistence on confidentiality is born of a tender concern for the welfare of the child, to hide his youthful errors and “bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.” In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1967). The prohibition of publication of a juvenile‘s name is designed to protect the young person from the stigma of his misconduct and is rooted in the principle that a court concerned with juvenile affairs serves as a rehabilitative and protective agency of the State. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Standard 5.13, pp. 224-225 (1976); see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 319 (1974); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-555 (1966). Publication of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of
By contrast, a prohibition against publication of the names of youthful offenders represents only a minimal interference with freedom of the press. West Virginia‘s statute, like similar laws in other States, prohibits publication only of the name of the young person. See
Without providing for punishment of such unauthorized publications it will be virtually impossible for a State to ensure the anonymity of its juvenile offenders. Even if the juvenile court‘s proceedings and records are closed to the public, the press still will be able to obtain the child‘s name in the same manner as it was acquired in this case. Ante, at 99; Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. Thus, the Court‘s reference to effective alternatives for accomplishing the State‘s goals is a mere chimera. The fact that other States do not punish publication of the names of juvenile offenders, while relevant,
Although I disagree with the Court that a state statute punishing publication of the identity of a juvenile offender can never serve an interest of the “highest order” and thus pass muster under the First Amendment, I agree with the Court that West Virginia‘s statute “does not accomplish its stated purpose.” Ante, at 105. The West Virginia statute prohibits only newspapers from printing the names of youths charged in juvenile proceedings. Electronic media and other forms of publication can announce the young person‘s name with impunity. In fact, in this case three radio stations broadcast the alleged assailant‘s name before it was published by the Charleston Daily Mail. Ante, at 99. This statute thus largely fails to achieve its purpose.3 It is difficult to take very seriously West Virginia‘s asserted need to preserve the anonymity of its youthful offenders when it permits other, equally, if not more, effective means of mass communication to distribute this information without fear of punishment. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 700; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 525 (1960). I, therefore, join in the Court‘s judgment striking down the West Virginia law. But for the reasons previously stated, I think that a generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of mass communication, electronic and print mediа alike, would be constitutional.