State v. Packingham
368 N.C. 380
| N.C. | 2015Background
- In 2013, North Carolina enacted N.C.G.S. § 14-202.5 prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commercial social networking sites.
- Officer Schnee identified defendant Packingham, a 2002 sex-offense offender, on the NC Sex Offender Registry and linked him to a Facebook page.
- A search of defendant’s residence recovered a notice listing sites he could not access; Facebook was involved as the site investigated.
- Packingham was indicted for violating § 14-202.5; trial court found constitutional as applied; conviction followed a jury verdict in 2012.
- Court of Appeals vacated the conviction, holding § 14-202.5 unconstitutional on its face and as applied; Supreme Court reversed.
- The statute defines a “commercial social networking site” with four criteria and exempts sites devoted solely to speech.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 14-202.5 a regulation of conduct or speech? | Packingham argues it regulates speech and invalid under strict scrutiny. | State contends it regulates conduct incidental to speech, subject to intermediate scrutiny. | Regulation of conduct; subject to intermediate scrutiny. |
| Is the statute facially constitutional under intermediate scrutiny as content-neutral? | Packingham contends overbreadth and vagueness despite content-neutral framing. | State argues narrow tailoring and ample alternatives keep it valid. | Constitutional on its face; narrowly tailored with ample alternatives. |
| Is the statute constitutional as applied to Packingham on the facts? | As applied challenges focus on incidental speech burden and sufficiency of government interest. | Statute furthers protecting minors; defendant’s conduct shows awareness and risk. | Constitutional as applied to Packingham. |
| Does the statute suffer from overbreadth or vagueness? | Overbreadth and vague terms could chill protected speech; broad sweep exists. | Statutory structure narrows scope; explicit definitions and exemptions exist. | Not overbroad or vague; not invalidated on those grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (Supreme Court, 1989) (content-neutral regulation must be narrowly tailored to substantial government interests)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (Supreme Court, 2015) (content-based vs content-neutral analysis for speech regulations)
- United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (Supreme Court, 1968) (four-factor test for intermediate regulation of conduct with incidental speech burden)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (Supreme Court, 2014) (strict vs intermediate scrutiny for content-based vs content-neutral speech regulations)
- Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289 (North Carolina Supreme Court, 2012) (intermediate scrutiny framework for state regulatory interests)
- Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (online conduct can be speech under First Amendment)
- Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169 (North Carolina Supreme Court, 1993) (First Amendment and vagueness considerations in state constitutional context)