State v. Obas, 147 Conn. App. 465

Background

Defendant Mycall Obas (then 18) pleaded guilty (2003) to second‑degree sexual assault for a 2002 offense involving a 15‑year‑old; court imposed nine months incarceration (mandatory), suspended execution, and ten years probation. Special conditions included ten‑year sex‑offender registration, sex‑offender evaluation/treatment, no contact with victim, and no unsupervised contact with anyone under 16.
Defendant complied with registration and treatment, violated probation once (failure to report address) which added two years to probation, then otherwise complied, obtained education and steady employment.
In 2011 defendant moved to modify probation: seek exemption from continued sex‑offender registration under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54‑251(b) and to relax the no‑unsupervised‑contact restriction; court ordered a psychosexual evaluation that rated low risk.
After contested hearings the trial court (Blawie, J.) exempted Obas from further registration under § 54‑251(b), modified the unsupervised‑contact prohibition to permit such contact with probation office approval, and allowed travel; the court denied the state permission to appeal that decision.
On appeal the Appellate Court held the trial court improvidently denied the state's request for permission to appeal but affirmed the trial court’s authority to grant the post‑sentence exemption and to modify probationary conditions.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Obas's Argument	Held
Whether § 54‑251(b) permits a court to exempt a person from registration after the registration obligation has commenced	§ 54‑251(b) contains no language authorizing post‑registration exemptions; statute’s scheme (notice provisions) contemplates exemption process before release/registration	Statute’s “may exempt” allows exemption later; probation statute and rehabilitative purpose permit modification after registration	Court: § 54‑251(b) can authorize a post‑commencement exemption where registration was a probation condition and later rehabilitation justifies modification
Whether plea agreement and its special‑condition terms bar later modification of probationary conditions (registration, no unsupervised contact)	Plea bargain terms were part of the agreed disposition and should be treated like a contract term that the court cannot alter after accepting the plea	Plea bargains are agreements between state and defendant; court is not a contracting party and retains statutory power to modify probation under § 53a‑30(c)	Court: Trial court retained statutory authority to modify or reduce probation conditions despite plea; plea does not divest court of discretion to modify or enlarge probation
Whether the trial court improperly denied the state permission to appeal under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54‑96	Denial was proper because § 54‑96 requires permission of the trial court	State argued denial was an extreme abuse of discretion and the issues met Lozada criteria	Court: Denial was improvident—Lozada criteria satisfied—state may appeal; appellate review conducted and decision affirmed on merits

Key Cases Cited

State v. James, 261 Conn. 395 (Conn. 2002) (Lozada criteria applied when state seeks permission to appeal under § 54‑96)
State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338 (Conn. 2004) (standard for reviewing trial court denial of state's permission to appeal; extreme abuse of discretion test)
Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1991) (criteria for showing issues are debatable and deserving of appellate review)
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1971) (plea bargains are promises by the prosecutor; court is not a contracting party)
State v. Crouch, 105 Conn. App. 693 (Conn. App. 2008) (probation terms may be modified or enlarged after plea‑bargained sentence)
State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174 (Conn. 2004) (probation statute’s rehabilitative purpose and court’s supervisory authority over probation)