State v. O'Donnell, 166 A.3d 646

Background

In 1993, Doreen Stiles gave two written statements and testified at probable cause and at the 1995 criminal trial identifying George Gould and Ronald Taylor as present at a store where the owner was murdered; Gould and Taylor were convicted.
In 2003 habeas proceedings, defendant Gerald O’Donnell (a private investigator assisting habeas counsel) met Stiles; on December 6, 2006 she gave O’Donnell a signed statement recanting her prior statements.
Between 2006–2009 O’Donnell visited Stiles regularly, drove her to appointments, paid some rent, gave money for a stereo, bought her food, and on May 12, 2007 purchased a television and service plan for her. He told her he did not think Gould and Taylor were guilty and hinted she might receive money depending on habeas outcomes.
At the 2009 habeas trial Stiles testified she had lied in 1993 and 1995. After the habeas court granted relief, the Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new habeas trial; before that retrial Stiles told police O’Donnell had ‘‘gotten inside [her] head’’ and she intended to confirm her original trial testimony but then asserted the Fifth at the retrial and did not testify.
O’Donnell was prosecuted and convicted by a jury of one count of bribery of a witness (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-149) and one count of witness tampering (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151); he challenged sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, admission/proffer procedure re: Stiles’ Fifth Amendment invocation, and the quashing of a subpoena for witness protection program records. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed on appeal.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	O’Donnell's Argument	Held
Sufficiency — bribery (§ 53a-149): whether the May 12, 2007 TV was given with intent to influence testimony	Evidence showed a benefit was conferred (TV, money, rent help, visits) after Stiles’ recantation and before 2009 habeas; jury could infer intent to influence	Gift were benign/charitable; recantation predated the gift so no intent to influence 2009 testimony	Affirmed — jury could reasonably infer the TV and other benefits were intended to influence Stiles’ habeas testimony
Sufficiency — witness tampering (§ 53a-151): whether O’Donnell induced Stiles to testify falsely in 2009	Prior 1993 statements and corroborating witness testimony supported that 1993/1995 testimony was true; O’Donnell’s post-2006 conduct could have induced a false 2009 recantation	Unclear which version of Stiles was truthful; absent proof 1993/1995 were true, cannot infer inducement to falsehood; also argued one-witness-plus-corroboration rule should apply	Affirmed — evidence supported tampering conviction; one-witness-plus-corroboration rule not required as a constitutional element and, even if applied, corroboration was sufficient
Jury instruction — failure to charge one‑witness‑plus‑corroboration rule	State: statute/evidence sufficed; court properly instructed on tampering elements	O’Donnell: trial court should have instructed rule from perjury cases (Sanchez) or plain error/supervisory relief	Affirmed — no plain error; instruction on statutory elements was proper and corroboration was adequate
Procedural/evidentiary rulings — refusal to proffer Stiles’ testimony outside jury and allowing her Fifth invocation before jury	State: proceedings assumed Fifth would be invoked and immunity given; no prosecutorial scheme to exploit invocation; Stiles later testified/immunity removed prejudice	O’Donnell: jury seeing Fifth invocation prejudiced them; court should have taken proffer out of jury presence to avoid inference	Affirmed — no prejudicial error: parties and court expected invocation and immunity; Stiles later testified and was cross-examined; jury could reasonably view invocation as self-protective
Discovery/subpoena — quash of subpoena for witness protection records	State: subpoena overly broad, sought sensitive/confidential material protected by statute; not shown necessary to selective-prosecution prima facie case	O’Donnell: records necessary to demonstrate selective prosecution and to present defense; subpoena was sufficiently particular	Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion: subpoena was overbroad, sought protected records, and defendant failed to show similarity to program beneficiaries or make prima facie showing for selective-prosecution hearing

Key Cases Cited

State v. Brantley, 164 Conn. App. 459 (Conn. App. 2016) (elements and intent for bribery of a witness)
State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472 (Conn. 1987) (one‑witness‑plus‑corroboration rule for perjury is evidentiary, not constitutional)
Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (U.S. 1963) (prejudice from witness invoking Fifth Amendment and prosecutorial misuse guidance)
State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (substantive use of prior signed inconsistent statements when declarant testifies and is subject to cross‑examination)
Gould v. Commissioner of Correction, 301 Conn. 544 (Conn. 2011) (prior habeas litigation; standard for actual innocence review)
State v. Ortiz, 312 Conn. 551 (Conn. 2014) (statutory elements of witness tampering)